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Why Do Large Shareholders Adopt a Short-Term versus a Long-Term 







I ask why the same large shareholders have different investment horizons. Using data 
for 1998–2013, I examine four fundamental firm policies for their potential influence on 
blockholders’ investments with different time horizons. The panel OLS, difference-in-
difference (using the Sarbanes-Oxley Act), logistic and dynamic GMM regression analyses 
reveal that blockholders adopt a short-term horizon in smaller firms with a less independent 
board, high leverage, and high dividends while the same blockholders keep their investments 
longer in firms with a more independent board and low dividends. Under various economic 
conditions, different firm characteristics gain importance in blockholders’ decision on short-










Firms exert a lot of effort to keep the types of large shareholders and institutional 
investors they feel would give them a competitive advantage. To investigate this further, many 
studies have already looked at the relation between firm characteristics and large shareholders 
in last decades. Some of them have investigated the impact of blockholders on various firm 
policies including dividends, investments, governance, innovation, and operations (e.g., Appel, 
Gormley and Keim, 2016; Becker, Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach, 2011; Cronqvist and 
Fahlenbrach, 2009; Holderness, 2003; Santos, Moreira and Vieira, 2014; Tribo, Berrone and 
Surroca, 2007). A large body of literature has studied the potential influence of institutional 
investors on firm value, performance, and stock returns (e.g., Cai and Zheng, 2004; Clifford 
and Lindsey, 2016; Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Shome and Singh, 1995; Sias, 
Starks and Titman, 2006; Wermers, 1999). Interestingly, few studies have considered the 
opposite direction regarding the relation between firm attributes and investors. Dahlquist and 
Robertsson (2001), Dong, Uchida and Hou (2014), Mak and Li (2001), and Yan and Zhang 
(2009) have examined possible effects of firm size, dividends, cash, and board structure on 
institutional investors. Some of the prior studies have analyzed investor horizons and corporate 
policies (Derrien, Kecskés and Thesmar, 2013; Gaspar, Massa and Matos, 2005; Thanassoulis 
and Somekh, 2016; Yan and Zhang, 2009). However, to my knowledge, studies have always 
focused on investors but not explored the individual investments in their portfolios. It is only a 
generalization to classify a large shareholder as a short-term or a long-term investor because 
that blockholder may have both types of investments in the portfolio. In other words, the same 
large shareholder can be a short-term blockholder in one firm while a long-term investor in 
another one.  
Thus, an open question exists for researchers: under what circumstances the same large 





believe this is an important question to understand the factors associated with blockholders’ 
choice of investment horizon. I aim to determine whether certain firm characteristics and 
policies may potentially influence the same large shareholder to keep his/her stakes shorter 
versus longer in different companies. In particular, I analyze firm characteristics, such as firm 
size and leverage, as well as policies on dividend payouts and corporate governance through 
board independence. I also explore various conditions under which firms operate and provide 
stylized facts about short-term and long-term blockholding investments. This study is 
innovative as I categorize each individual investment rather than investors as either short term 
or long term. This has crucial importance because this method enables me to overcome 
potential difficulties and misspecification caused by generalization of all investments 
associated with one investor. By categorizing individual investments, I can correctly model 
and so estimate the relation between firm attributes and the hold and sell decisions of short-
term and long-term blockholding stakes of the same large shareholder. The analyses succeed 
in passing a battery of goodness-of-fit and robustness tests addressing potential empirical issues 
such as endogeneity, survivorship, and omitted variable bias. Therefore, I can offer robust 
statistical insights. Particularly, analyzing the connection between blockholder investments and 
firm characteristics is challenging, because causality may run from the former to the latter. I 
try to mitigate this reverse causality issue by lagging the explanatory variables of firm 
characteristics by one year. More importantly, I use a dynamic panel generalized method of 
moments (GMM) model and also exploit the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act and 
the associated changes by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in a difference-in-
difference (DID) model setup to alleviate the reverse causality concerns. Last, I conduct further 
analyses with specific subsamples to address potential issues related to identification of 
investor horizon. 





in panel ordinary least squares (OLS), logistic and dynamic GMM regression analyses. A 
blockholder is defined as an investor with at least 5% ownership of a particular firm. A 
blockholding investment has short-term (long-term) horizon if it stays with the firm less than 
three (more than seven) years. In the OLS and GMM models, I regress the number of retained 
blockholding investments with short-term (long-term) horizon on board independence, 
dividend ratio, leverage, and firm size. Using firm-investor-year observations in logistic 
regression analyses, I define a dummy variable that equals one for a blockholder with a short-
term (long-term) investment in a particular firm in at the end of year t, as well as year t+1. I 
regress this dummy variable on those four fundamental firm policies and characteristics. 
Different from the literature, first I consider blockholders adopting a short-term over a long-
term investment horizon. I begin with a surprising insight: board independence is a deterrent 
to this type of investment. The results suggest that the same large shareholders adopt a short-
term horizon in firms with a less independent board. This finding favors the hypothesis that 
blockholders have short-term investments in firms with weak management who are therefore 
more inclined to acquiesce to and implement the blockholder’s policies. I further find that the 
same blockholders choose to keep their investments shorter in smaller firms with high leverage 
and high dividend payouts. These results could be rationalized by the view that short-term 
investors like dividends as a source of cash flow and they would like to see firms they own 
increasing firm risk through leverage before they sell out of the stock. 
Next, I study under what conditions the same blockholders adopt a long-term horizon 
in firms. The statistical analysis demonstrates that increasing board independence increases the 
probability of attracting and retaining such investments. This suggests that investors planning 
a long-term investment value an independent board; and this is consistent with the idea that an 
independent board will be best placed to take value-enhancing decisions into the future. 





smaller in size, pay less dividends, and have high leverage. These findings could be explained 
by the view that long-term blockholders support growth in leverage as a consequence of an 
expanding and successful firm, and prefer cash invested in growth projects as opposed to paid 
to shareholders. 
The findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the same blockholders may adopt 
different investment horizons based on different firm policies and attributes. Smaller firms with 
a less independent board, higher than average dividend ratio, and high leverage are more likely 
to have short-term blockholding investments. This is compatible with the view that 
blockholders with short-term investments are often “activist,” having stakes in smaller firms 
with weak governance that are less resistant to the blockholders changing firm policies. In their 
short holding period, such investors on average benefit from high dividend payments as well 
as profitable share buybacks. Supporting the results, Strobl and Zeng (2017) show that activist 
investors usually have a shorter planning horizon. Furthermore, Andreou, Fiordelisi, Harris and 
Philip (2017) suggest that transient institutional investors intervene and exert pressure on 
managers to generate immediate high profit. Considering long-term investments, I find that 
smaller firms with higher than average board independence, high leverage, and low dividends 
are more likely to have long-term blockholding investments. These results support the 
hypothesis of such investments being “passive,” and such investors hold shares of firms with 
strong governance along with evidence of growth. Similarly, Appel, Gormley and Keim (2016) 
also associate long-term investors with passive shareholders. 
This study contributes to the firm policy and large shareholder ownership literature by 
providing insight into how fundamental firm policies and characteristics are related to the 
decision on a short-term versus a long-term investment strategy in different firms by the same 
large shareholders. The paper also reveals which firm attributes gain importance in 





literature focus on an investor by considering investments in the portfolio altogether to classify 
that shareholder’s overall investment horizon. Unlike those papers, I use a new classification 
approach regarding blockholders’ individual investments with different holding periods in their 
portfolios. Hence, this paper will present further explanation to the relation between firms and 
blockholding stakes. 
The external validity of my findings can be tested in further extended research. I 
consider all investors relying on electronic data that may not be complete. Hand-collecting data 
from various databases will mitigate this potential concern. Also, a cross-country examination 
may bring further explanation to the relation between firms and investments by blockholders 
considering their different investment agendas under different country-specific conditions. 
The rest of the paper proceeds first by discussing the related literature and developing 
the hypotheses to be tested in Section 2. Section 3 describes the data selection and variable 
construction. The empirical methodology is then explained in Section 4. There follows the 
main results in Section 5, then in Section 6 I conduct robustness checks and further analyses. I 
conclude in Section 7. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
2.1. Related Literature and Hypothesis Building 
Previous contributions have examined the relation between institutional investors, 
blockholders and various firm attributes. Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) examine mutual 
funds and other institutional investors separately. They use a blockholder fixed effects 
approach to investigate the influence of blockholders on firm policies and performance. 
Becker, Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2011) instrument the existence of an individual large 
shareholder via the density of wealthy individuals near a firm’s headquarters. They study the 





liquidity, investment, and firm performance. Gugler, Ivanova and Zechner (2014) examine the 
determinants and effects of individual investor control in Central and Eastern European 
countries. In their model, they consider Tobin’s Q, performance, governance, size, leverage, 
risk, and intangibility in relation to large individual investors. Cai, Hillier and Wang (2016) 
study the cost of multiple large shareholders and suggest that conflicting incentives induce a 
nonlinear relationship between the relative size of large shareholdings and firm value. Tribo, 
Berrone and Surroca (2007) present that impact of large shareholders on the research and 
development (R&D) investment is negative when blockholders are banks, but it is positive 
when blockholders are nonfinancial corporations. Few other studies including Shome and 
Singh (1995), Wright, Ferris, Sarin and Awasthi (1996), Steiner (1996), Edmans (2009), 
Gregoric, Masten and Zajc (2011), and Dhillon and Rosetto (2015) examine the effect of 
blockholders on firm performance, risk, and growth. 
 In this paper, I consider four fundamental firm policies and characteristics: corporate 
governance, capital structure, dividend policy, and firm size. I examine how these factors are 
related to short-term versus long-term investment decisions by the same large shareholders in 
different firms.  In the literature, Mak and Li (2001) and Burton, Gunasekarage and Kumarasiri 
(2013) examine the relation between corporate ownership and board composition of firms in 
Singapore and New Zealand, respectively. Fernandez and Arrondo (2005) show that large 
blockholder ownership decreases board independence in Spanish firms. They suggest a 
substitution among internal controls.  Miletkov, Poulsen and Wintoki (2014) examine the effect 
of board independence on the firm’s ability to attract foreign equity capital. They show that 
there is a positive relation between board independence and foreign institutional ownership. 
Appel, Gormley and Keim (2016) classify passive institutional investors as long-term 
shareholders and find that passive mutual funds influence firms’ governance choices, resulting 





not have sufficient enough resources necessary to monitor the detailed policy choices of every 
firm in their diversified portfolios and hence rely on low-cost monitoring of firms with best 
governance practices. Further, Bhide (1993) argues that the liquidity of the U.S. equity market 
reduces blockholders’ incentives to monitor firms for a long term because selling the shares of 
poorly managed firms is substantially cheaper than the overall cost of monitoring such firms 
for a long period. Therefore, blockholders may adopt a long-term investment horizon in well-
governed firms with a more independent board that may be able to take more objective business 
decisions and so grow faster while such firms also lower monitoring cost for these large 
shareholders. 
Hypothesis 1.A. Board independence is attractive to long-term blockholding investments. 
Contrary to that, a firm with a less independent board and hence a weak governance 
may be easier to influence and therefore more beneficial to activist blockholders who have a 
short-term view and aim to implement their policies. Black (1992), Pound (1992), and Karpoff, 
Malatesta and Walkling (1996) argue that activist investors target firms with a poor governance 
structure and influence corporate policy using proposals. Indeed, Figure IA.2 in the Online 
Appendix shows that about 90% of the activism proposals are associated with short-term 
blockholding investments. Alternatively, firms with insider-dominated boards exhibit higher 
managerial myopia, which is in line with the interest of blockholders who have a short-term 
investment horizon and aim high return in that short period of time (Graham, Harvey and 
Rajgopal, 2005). Consequently, blockholders may adopt a short-term investment horizon in 
firms with a less independent board. 
Hypothesis 1.B. Board independence is a deterrent to short-term blockholding investments. 
Considering leverage, Santos, Moreira and Vieira (2014) focus on 694 firms from 12 
Western European countries and show a link between firm leverage and blockholder 





as determinants of corporate policies and shows that firms decrease leverage if their current 
leverage is higher than the aggregated preference of their institutional investors. Derrien, 
Kecskés and Thesmar (2013) argue that long-term investors mitigate the effect of stock 
mispricing on corporate policies. They show that undervalued firms have more equity (than 
debt) financing when long-term investors have higher ownership. Contrary to them, Brailsford, 
Oliver and Pua (2002) examine Australian firms over the period 1989–1995 and argue that 
self-interested managers have incentives to reduce corporate debt because the occurrence of 
bankruptcy or financial distress will result in loss of employment, impairment of future 
employment, and lower earnings capacity of managers. However, the decrease in corporate 
debt is avoided if a firm has high blockholder ownership, which acts as a monitoring 
mechanism over managers. Large shareholders not only prevent the decrease in debt but also 
may favor high leverage because the adverse feature of leverage increases firm value by 
preventing managers from taking poor projects (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990). Moreover, leverage 
increases risk level of the firm, and more importantly, it induces growth. Consistent with Fama 
and French (1993), Shin and Stulz (2000) provide evidence for high-growth firms having 
higher risk, and they show that high growth translates into higher firm value. Considering the 
firm value increasing features of leverage, large shareholders may find companies with high 
leverage more attractive. They adopt a short-term horizon in such firms if they aim for high 
stock prices through increased firm risk before they sell out of the shares. Meanwhile, the same 
blockholders choose to keep their stakes longer in a firm with high leverage if they support 
growth through leverage leading to an expanding and successful firm with high value in the 
long run. 
Hypothesis 2.A. Leverage is positively related to short-term blockholding investments. 
Hypothesis 2.B. Leverage is positively related to long-term blockholding investments. 





payments and corporate blockholders and cannot find any significant connection between 
them. Contrary to that, Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001), in their study of foreign ownership 
in Swedish firms, show that foreign institutional investors prefer large firms paying low 
dividends. Similarly, Desai and Jin (2011) suggest that dividend-averse institutions are 
significantly less likely to hold shares in firms with larger dividend payouts. Yan and Zhang 
(2009) research the relation between firm attributes (e.g., firm size, age, dividends, stock price, 
return, and volatility) and short-term and long-term institutional investors. They find that short-
term investors prefer firms with lower dividend yield while dividend is not consistently related 
to long-term institutional ownership. Derrien, Kecskés and Thesmar (2013) show that for 
undervalued firms, payouts to shareholders are decreasing in investor horizons. Firms with 
larger dividends offer investors a steady stream of cash flow. This is attractive for investors 
especially if they have a short-term investment horizon. Such large shareholders can enjoy high 
dividend payments because their intention is to sell out of the stocks sooner than later when 
dividends are still high. Short-term blockholders prefer to maximize their profit through 
dividends before they leave the firm rather than to allow the firm to reduce dividends and invest 
the cash into growth projects, which will pay off in the long run.  
Hypothesis 3.A. Dividend is positively associated with short-term blockholding investments. 
On the other hand, the same large shareholders may adopt a long-term horizon in firms 
that minimize cash flowing from the firm to shareholders and invest in the long-term growth 
projects instead. Alti (2003) confirms that firms with high growth rates pay little or no 
dividends and use their cash flow primarily for funding investment. This is in line with a life-
cycle approach to investment targets: Firms at the beginning of their long-term growth 
trajectory pay less dividends. Such long-term growth projects help the firm to grow, and 
subsequently, firm value increases in the long term. Hence, this would imply that moving cash 





blockholders with a long-term view. 
Hypothesis 3.B. Dividend is negatively associated with long-term blockholding investments. 
Collins, Gong and Hribar (2003) show that firms with low institutional ownership are 
smaller and less profitable. Similarly, Yan and Zhang (2009) argue that both short-term and 
long-term institutional investors prefer larger stocks. Unlike them, Dong, Uchida and Hou 
(2014) investigate block trades in China and discuss that firm size is negatively related to 
investments by blockholders. However, their study focuses only on the Chinese market and 
also does not consider any potential effect due to the differences in investor horizons. 
Holderness (2009) suggests that investors’ wealth constraints may force them to invest in 
smaller firms. There exists a shadow cost to blockholders seeking to raise funds. Since 
investing in small firms should require less funds, such firms can be more attractive to both 
short-term and long-term large shareholders. Furthermore, Dunne and Hughes (1994) show 
that smaller firms indeed grow faster compared to larger companies. This trend in rapid growth 
translates into higher firm valuations (Maury and Pajuste, 2005) in the short run as well as long 
run. Therefore, both short-term and long-term blockholders may consider investing in smaller 
firms. 
Hypothesis 4.A. Firm size is negatively related to short-term blockholding investments. 
Hypothesis 4.B. Firm size is negatively related to long-term blockholding investments. 
 
2.2. Closely Related Literature and Incremental Contribution 
This paper is closely related to a few studies on investor horizon and institutional 
investors. Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) focus on Swedish firms and analyze foreign 
investors’ preferences. They examine mutual funds and other institutional investors separately 
and find that foreigners prefer large firms with low dividend payments and high cash holdings. 





investors’ preferences for different firm characteristics change according to their investment 
horizon. This new angle enriches the discussion on the relation between institutional investors 
and firms.  
Yan and Zhang (2009) investigate the relation between various firm characteristics 
(e.g., firm size, age, dividends, stock price, return, and volatility) and short-term and long-term 
institutional investors. Their study shows that short-term investors prefer younger firms with 
less dividends while dividend is not consistently related to long-term institutional ownership. 
Both types of investors prefer large firms with high price volatility. Yan and Zhang (2009) 
discuss that short-term institutions’ trading predicts future stock returns, especially for small 
and growth stocks. Different from this study, I consider the individual investments in 
blockholders’ portfolios with different time horizons rather than just the types of investors. 
This enables me to explore a new dimension of blockholder ownership and examine accurately 
under which fundamental firm policies the same large shareholders adopt a short-term versus 
a long-term horizon. Moreover, I study which firm characteristics gain more importance in 
blockholders’ decision under various economic conditions: dot-com bubble and subprime 
mortgage crisis times, high bankruptcy risk, high stock price volatility, low liquidity of shares, 
busy board, high CEO ownership, conglomerate firms, industry concentration, as well as 
different industries preferred by blockholders (i.e., manufacturing, construction, wholesale and 
retail, electronics and telecommunication, and service). 
Sulaeman (2011) analyzes the revealed preferences of institutional investors for firm 
policies. The study particularly focuses on leverage. The findings show that a firm is more 
likely to increase (decrease) leverage if its current leverage is lower (higher) than the 
aggregated preference of its institutional shareholders. Extending this study, I examine 
dividend ratio, firm size, and board independence in relation to blockholding investments. 






Cella, Ellul and Giannetti (2011) analyze the impact of market shocks on shareholders 
with different investment horizons. They show that stocks held by short-term investors 
experience more severe price drops than those held by long-term investors, and short-term 
investors also sell significantly more than long-term investors around the negative market 
shocks. Similar to this paper, I study investor horizon. However, I analyze various firm 
characteristics that influence blockholders’ investment horizon. Moreover, I can also identify 
individual investments in large shareholders’ portfolios regarding different time horizons. 
These nuances provide additional understanding in shareholders’ investment behavior. 
Gaspar, Massa, Matos, Patgiri and Rehman (2011) examine how investment horizon 
affects payout policy choices. They find that the amount of share repurchases increases with 
ownership by short-term investors to the detriment of dividends. Their study also shows that 
the market reacts less positively to repurchase announcements made by firms held by short-
term institutional investors. In this paper, I extend the study by Gaspar et al. (2011) and explore 
the potential influence of not only dividends but also leverage, firm size, and board 
independence on large shareholders’ decision on investment horizon. I contribute further by 
analyzing this relation under various economic conditions. 
Derrien, Kecskés and Thesmar (2013) investigate the impact of investor horizons on 
corporate behavior. They discuss that long-term investments weaken the effect of stock 
mispricing on corporate policies. They find that for undervalued firms, long-term investor 
ownership is related to less payout to shareholders, more investment, and more equity 
financing. Building on their research, I explore the flipside of this relation and study the 
influence of firm attributes on short-term and long-term blockholding investments. Moreover, 
I use a battery of tests and methods including a DID regression and a dynamic system GMM 





strengthen the paper’s contribution.  
Dong, Uchida and Hou (2014) investigate block trades in China. Particularly, they 
analyze firm characteristics associated with the likelihood of firms becoming targets for 
blockholders. They discuss that firms with high free-cash flow are likely to be block trade 
targets, while ownership concentration, director ownership, and firm size are negatively related 
to investments by blockholders. Extending their study, I consider the horizon of investment 
strategies by large shareholders. In addition to these factors, I contribute by examining the 
payout policy, board structure, firm growth, and risk in relation to blockholders’ investment 
horizon.  
Appel, Gormley and Keim (2016) consider passive institutional shareholders as long-
term investors. They examine whether and by which mechanisms these investors influence 
firms’ governance. They show that passive mutual funds promote board independence and 
increase firm value and long-term performance. Building on their paper, I analyze both short-
term and long-term investments. Different from their study, I explicitly research the individual 
investments in blockholders’ portfolios rather than just the types of investors. I contribute to 
the literature by studying which firm attributes become more important in blockholders’ 
decision under crisis times, high risk, low liquidity, and different industry sectors and 
conditions. 
 
3. Data Selection and Variable Construction 
In this study, I use data from FactSet, ISS, Compustat, and CRSP databases covering 
the 16 years running from 1998 through 2013. The initial data set has observations of firm 
investment years: thus, if investor  owns a proportion of firm  in year , then this represents 
a data point as an investment. I use electronic ownership data that may have caveats 





over 100%. I correct the data set for any instances of ownership double counting (Dlugosz, 
Fahlenbrach, Gompers and Metrick, 2006). I exclude blockholding investors if they are index 
funds, top managers, and their representatives on the board. Blockholders in this sample obtain 
their stakes via public placements. Finally, I check that the sample corresponds to those of 
previous work. Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) base their study on the hand-collected data 
by Dlugosz, Fahlenbrach, Gompers and Metrick (2006). They have 361 unique blockholders 
for a sample between 1996 and 2002. In this sample, I have 306 unique blockholders for the 
period 1998–2002.1 This sample of investors include private equity firms, venture capital, 
professional investors, corporate investors, hedge funds, mutual funds, pension funds, trust 
companies, and insurance firms without any restrictions on the level of ownership. Panel A in 
Figure 1 shows that 83% of the blockholders in the sample have ownership of 5%–10% in a 
firm, while 14% of them have 10%–15% ownership. Only 3% of the blockholder sample have 
more than 15% of firm ownership. Panel B in Figure 1 shows that average firm ownership by 
a blockholder is between 7.5% and 8.5% per year. Total number of blockholdings in firms 
increases throughout the years, especially after 2006. These statistics are in keeping with those 
of other analyses, and so I conclude that this sample is valid for my analyses. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
The final sample has firm-investment-year observations and other firm characteristics. 
From the universe of data points, I exclude firms classified as financial firms or utilities. I then 
winsorize the remaining variables with extreme values at 1% and 99%. I drop firms that do not 
receive investment in any of the sample years from a blockholding investor. I drop any 
observations for which the sum of long-term and short-term debt was recorded as being greater 
than total assets. The remaining sample consists of 3,337,912 firm-investment-year 
                                               
1 I provide a more detailed comparison in Table IA.1, Online Appendix. The Online Appendix is 





observations with 5,146 investors and 1,836 firms. 
 
3.1. Blockholding Investment Variables 
Given a firm-investment-year observation I define , ,  to take the value one if 
investor  has a material stake in firm  (meaning at or over 5% of the equity) in year , and 
zero otherwise. In other words, investor  is a blockholder of firm  at time  if , , = 1. 
The vast majority of blockholders in the sample have firm ownership between 5% and 10%. 
Since the difference between the levels of ownership among blockholders is not big, I can use 
dummy variables to represent investments by blockholders.2  
 Next, I characterize whether an investment in a given firm is realized to be of short-
term or long-term duration. This focus on the type of investment is a distinguishing feature of 
this analysis. Previous studies including Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2005) and Yan and Zhang 
(2009) calculate average churn rate of each institution and sort investors accordingly. Those 
with high (low) scores are classified as short-term (long-term) investors. In a similar logic to 
these studies, I calculate the holding period for each blockholding investment. It is the period 
of time through which a blockholder holds the shares of that particular firm. After I sort 
blockholding investments accordingly, I determine the cutoff roughly as the bottom quintile (2 
years) and the top quintile (8 years) for short-term and long-term horizon, respectively. I define 
a short-term investment by creating the dummy variable  , ,  to equal one if the 
investment by blockholder  remains above 5% of the firm’s equity only for at most two 
consecutive years, and zero otherwise. Then I define: 
  , , ≡
1 if  , , =1 and  , , =1 
0 otherwise
  (1) 
  , ,  takes the value one if investor  will keep at least 5% of ownership of firm 
                                               





 in year  and year + 1, and if this investment will be short term and so last for at most two 
years. This variable will allow me to study the attributes that encourage the same large 
shareholders to adopt a short-term investment horizon. 
Analogously, I capture long-term investment by creating the dummy variable 
 , , , which takes the value of one if ownership by a blockholder  remains above the 5% 
level for eight or more consecutive years, and zero otherwise. Similar to Equation (1), I define 
and analyze   , ,  to establish the features of firms that the same blockholders 
consider while deciding on a long-term investment in those firms. 
 In the main analysis, I define Number of ST BH as the number of short-term 
blockholding investments in that year in that particular firm. Similarly, I define Number of LT 
BH to be the number of long-term blockholding investments in that firm. For robustness, I also 
use ST BH (%) and LT BH (%). These variables represent a short-term and a long-term 
blockholding investment as the ownership in a particular firm in that year, respectively. 
 
3.2. Firm Variables  
I focus on four fundamental firm policies: corporate governance, capital structure, 
dividend policy, and firm size. I examine how these factors are related to short-term versus 
long-term investment decisions by the same large shareholders in different firms. Following 
the literature (e.g., Yan and Zhang, 2009; Sulaeman, 2011; Derrien, Kecskés and Thesmar, 
2013; Appel, Gormley and Keim, 2016), I define the firm variables the following way. Board 
Independence is the percentage of outsider directors on the board. These directors are not 
associated with the firm. Leverage is the sum of current liabilities and long-term debt over total 
assets. Dividend Ratio denotes the ratio of the total dividend payment in the year to the market 






3.3. Summary Statistics  
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for all these variables. Panel A presents the 
variables on investment characteristics. Of the investment-firm-year observations, 16.5% 
belong to blockholding investments—that is, their ownership stake exceeds 5%. The holding 
period of firms’ shares by blockholding investors is, on average, approximately four years. Of 
the investment-firm-year observations that correspond to blockholders, 25.3% are short-term 
investments where the investment duration is only for one or two years, and 17.6% of 
blockholding investments are long-term investments for eight or more years. Per firm on 
average, there are one and two blockholders with a long-term and a short-term investment 
horizon, respectively. While the maximum number of short-term investments is eight, there are 
at most four long-term blockholding investments in a firm. 
 [Insert Table 1 about here] 
Panel B of Table 1 focuses on the characteristics of firms that are held by at least one 
blockholder. These firms have three quarters of their board composed of outsiders. The mean 
leverage for the, in part, blockholder-owned firms in the sample is 21.7%. Those firms pay 
dividends equivalent to 0.014% of their market value on average.  The average firm size owned 
by blockholders is $9.8 billion. 
Panel C of Table 1 displays statistics on firms with at least one short-term blockholding 
investment. On average, board independence is 74.7% and leverage is 21.7%. Furthermore, 
statistically significant mean differences imply that these firms are mainly not similar to the 
companies chosen by long-term blockholding investments. For those companies with at least 
one long-term blockholding investment, 75.6% of their boards are composed of independent 
directors, the average dividend payments are 0.016% of their market value. 
The correlation values between variables of the main model are presented in Panel D 





most having correlation coefficient below 0.250. This suggests that collinearity is not a 
problem, which is discussed in later robustness checks in detail. 
Having divided the data into long-term and short-term blockholder ownership, I can 
identify what proportion of each type of investments are in which industries. Figure 2 shows 
the distribution by industry sector of short-term and long-term blockholdings. Compared to 
short-term blockholdings, long-term blockholdings have greater weight in Manufacturing and 
Wholesale & Retail industries. By contrast, short-term blockholdings show greater weight than 
long-term ones in the Healthcare, Telecommunication, and Nondurable Goods (e.g., food, 
tobacco, textile, toys) sectors. Overall, more than 50% of a blockholder’s investment portfolio 
is concentrated on three main industries: Manufacturing, High-Tech, and Wholesale & Retail. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Figure 3 displays the distribution of blockholders in the sample according to the 
difference between the total percentage by value of long-term versus short-term investments in 
their portfolios. Figure 3 shows at least three subgroups of blockholder portfolios. The first 
group is distributed around –60%. It represents blockholders with portfolios of more short-term 
investments than long-term ones. The next subgroup is at the 0% level: these are investors who 
have a balanced portfolio (50% LT – 50% ST = 0%). The last subgroup is smaller, and it is 
distributed around the 50% level representing blockholders who have more long-term 
investments in their portfolios. This figure indicates that blockholders in my sample have 
portfolios of investments with different horizons. The same large shareholder may have a long-
term investment with one firm while having a short-term investment with another firm. 
Classifying a blockholder as the average of investment horizons in the portfolio would define 
inaccurately the relation of that large shareholder to some firms in the portfolio. Therefore, it 
is not the precise way to identify a blockholder-firm relation by averaging investment horizons. 





[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
4. Empirical Methodology 
4.1. Main Model: Fixed Effects Panel OLS Regression 
The first multivariate analysis is conducted using a fixed effects panel OLS regression 
model. In the analysis, I try to explore how fundamental firm characteristics are related to a 
blockholder’s decision on a short-term versus a long-term investment horizon. Using firm-year 
observations, I regress Number of ST BH and Number of LT BH on one-year lagged firm 
attributes: Board Independence, Leverage, Dividend Ratio, and Firm Size. Year and firm fixed 
effects are added to the model. The fixed effects approach controls for the omitted variables 
that differ between firms but are constant over time. I confirm, through the Hausman test, that 
the fixed effects approach dominates a random effects specification. Standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level. The model is specified as follows: 
, =
+ ∗  , + ∗ ,
+ ∗  , + ∗  , + ,
              (2) 
where the measure for the number of short-term (long-term) blockholding investment is Y; the 
firm observation is f = 1, … , N; the entire period is t = 1998, … , 2013; and α, β, γ, δ, θ, μ are 
the coefficients of the constant term, firm characteristics, and error term, respectively. 
Edmans and Holderness (2017) discuss that it is extremely difficult to identify causal 
effects in the relation between blockholders and firms. They suggest that the research will be 
very narrowing if a clear identification for causality is strictly required for empirical analyses 
on blockholders. Following their view, I do not make strong claims on causality from firm 
characteristics to blockholder investments in this study. Instead, I try to show the relation 
between certain firm policies and the choice of blockholding investments with different 
horizons. I acknowledge the concerns for endogeneity and use several methods to mitigate, if 





the link between blockholder investments and firm characteristics is challenging, because 
causality may run from the former to the latter. I follow Becker, Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach 
(2011), who advocate a time lag between dependent and independent variables as a mitigation 
to simultaneity bias. In my model, dependent variables refer to the ownership status of an 
investor in the current year, while the explanatory variables of firm characteristics are based 
on the preceding year.3 In further analyses, I use a dynamic panel GMM estimator suggested 
by Wintoki, Linck and Netter (2012) to alleviate endogeneity concerns. The estimator 
incorporates the dynamic nature of firm policies to provide valid and powerful instruments that 
address unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity. Since the dynamic panel GMM estimator 
relies partially on first-differencing, the regressions in the model are less subject the spurious 
correlations. It also mitigates any potential omitted variable bias as it eliminates the effects of 
time-invariant firm heterogeneity. Using these approaches, I can alleviate the concern for 
endogeneity by reverse causality even though I may not completely eliminate it.4 
 
4.2. Second Model: Logistic Regression 
I study whether fundamental firm characteristics are linked to blockholders’ decision 
on short-term versus long-term investments. In addition to the panel OLS regression model, I 
explore this question through a different perspective using the probability of retaining the 
blockholding investments. The observation of interest is binary: either an investor keeps a 
(short-term or long-term) blockholding stake of more than 5% of the firm’s equity or not. I take 
the approach of modeling the probability  of retaining a stake. Each firm-investment-year 
observation is then a realization from this modeled probability distribution. I analyze this using 
                                               
3 In further analyses, I also include multiple-year lags of the regressors in the models. I obtain mainly 
robust results. 






the logistic regression model. Standard errors are clustered at the investment-firm level. Let 
, ,  denote the probability investor i stays as a blockholder with a short-term investment in 
firm f at time t+1, then I have 
 ln , ,
, ,
=
+ ∗  , + ∗ ,
+ ∗  , + ∗  , + + , ,
            (3) 
where α, β, γ, δ, θ, μ are the coefficients of the constant term, firm characteristics, and error 
term, respectively. A similar analysis is possible for the probability an investor stays as a 
blockholder with a long-term investment. 
A one-unit increase in  in the model multiplies the initial odds by a factor of , 
which is often referred to as the odds ratio. In the analysis, I report the coefficient estimates for 
both the estimated logit regressors  and the odds ratios, { }.  As a second aid to 
interpretation, note that if the variable  increases by one unit, the odds of an event occurring 
(p/(1-p)) will increase by − 1 %. Thus, if = 0.41, then a one-unit increase in  will 
raise the odds of the event occurring by 50% as . − 1 = 0.5. The odds themselves are 
increased by a factor of 1.5 as . = 1.5. Whereas if = −0.69, then a one-unit increase in 
 will reduce the odds of the event occurring by 50% as . − 1 = −0.5. The odds 
themselves from a unit increase in  will change by a factor of 0.5 as . = 0.5. 
Similar to the fixed effects panel OLS regression model, I have a time lag between 
dependent and independent variables in the logistic regression model. In this way, I try to 
ensure that the decision to stay as a blockholder with a short-term (long-term) horizon is 
influenced by lagged firm characteristics but not the other way around. 
 
5. Main Results on Hypotheses 
5.1. Why Do the Same Blockholders Adopt a Short-Term Investment Horizon?  





(i.e., corporate governance, capital structure, dividends, and firm size) and the same 
blockholders’ decision to keep their stakes short term at or above the 5% ownership level in a 
company. In Panel A of Table 2, the number of blockholders with a short-term horizon is 
negatively related to Board Independence at the 1% level of significance. A one–standard 
deviation (about 14.4%) increase in board independence reduces the number of retained 
blockholders with short-term investment horizon by 5.6% (= –0.391 * 0.144). Thus, 
Hypothesis 1.B is supported. From the investors’ perspective, this result favors the view that 
the same blockholder keeps investments shorter term in a firm with a more compliant board. 
Such investors perhaps prefer firms with weak management who are therefore more inclined 
to acquiesce to and implement the blockholder’s policies. Alternatively, these firms with an 
insider-dominated board may exhibit managerial myopia, which is in line with the interests of 
blockholders with short-term investments. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
The hypothesis on the value of dividends (Hypothesis 3.A) is supported. This result is 
consistent with the view that investors with a short-term horizon like dividends as a source of 
cash flow. Specifically, more blockholders adopt a short-term investment horizon (relative 
increase of about 3% = 1.235 * 0.024) if firms increase dividend payouts by 0.024% (one 
standard deviation).5 
The firm size hypothesis (Hypothesis 4.A) is also supported. Short-term blockholding 
investments leave larger firms; the number of blockholders deciding on a short-term investment 
in firms drops by 10.4% (= –0.068 * 1.527) if those firms were to grow in size by one standard 
deviation. 
Perhaps surprisingly, I reject Hypothesis 2.A. Leverage does not have a significant 
                                               
5 Additional analysis on outstanding firm shares reveals that total shares drop by 30.5 million (16.5%) 
on average during the short-term investment period for those companies. This may imply a profitable 





effect on short-term blockholding investments. An indifference to current leverage levels may 
be consistent with a preference for a compliant board, as the latter may allow the investor to 
pursue the borrowing desires of the blockholder independently of the current leverage position.  
The results using the ownership by blockholders with short-term focus—that is, ST BH 
(%)—support the main findings. When firms increase size or board independence, the 
ownership by blockholders with short-term investment horizon is less the next year. Higher 
dividend payments are associated with an increase in blockholders’ short-term stakes in those 
firms.  
I study the firm characteristics and short-term blockholding investments also via a 
second model: the logistic regression analysis. Panel B of Table 2 provides the results for betas 
 (from the logit regression) along with their standard errors and odds ratios. The sometimes 
more easily interpretable odds ratio interpretation   is also reported. 
The hypothesis on board independence (Hypothesis 1.B) remains supported. An 
increase in the independence of the board lowers the probability of a short-term blockholding 
investment staying for a second year, and this result is significant at the 1% level. This adds 
further support to the contention that the same blockholders adopt a short-term horizon in firms 
with a more compliant board. Turning to leverage (Hypothesis 2.A), whereas before no 
statistical result could be found, now the findings support the hypothesis that high leverage is 
positively related to short-term blockholding investments. This could be rationalized by the 
view that blockholders would keep their stakes in firms and sell out of the stock after a short 
term when those companies increase firm risk through leverage.6 Interesting results are 
available on the dividend (Hypothesis 3.A). If the firm is delivering higher dividends, it 
                                               
6 In untabulated analyses, I examine the bankruptcy risk via Altman Z-score and find that on average 
an additional 2.1% of firms become financially distressed right before blockholders sell their short-term 
stakes in those firms. This finding implies that the strategy of higher leverage to increase the firm risk 






significantly increases the odds of keeping the short-term investments into a second year, here 
by a factor of 10.67. The hypothesis on firm size (Hypothesis 4.A) is again strongly supported: 
it is less likely that short-term blockholding investments stay in large firms, which perhaps 
offer less room to grow in the future. 
The findings reveal that the same large shareholders adopt a short-term investment 
horizon only in particular companies. Smaller firms with a less independent board, high 
dividend ratio, and high leverage are attractive to short-term investments.  These findings are 
consistent with the hypothesis of an “active approach” by blockholders with short-term 
investments who perhaps have a “short-term profit” agenda. Such investors decide on a shorter 
investment period perhaps in more weakly governed smaller firms allowing them greater 
influence on firm decisions. In their short holding period, they benefit from high dividend 
payouts, profitable share buybacks, and once firm risk is high enough, they sell the stocks. 
Exploring this further, I examine the distribution of shareholder proposals with activism among 
long-term and short-term blockholding investments in this sample. Online Appendix Figure 
IA.2 shows that 10% of activism proposals belong to long-term blockholding investments on 
average, while 90% of them are brought up by short-term blockholders. These statistics support 
the implications here that blockholders with a shorter investment horizon actively engage in 
changing firm policies concerning governance and focus of the firm.  
 
5.2. Why Do the Same Blockholders Adopt a Long-Term Investment Horizon?  
The results for long-term blockholding investments are contained in Panel A of Table 
2. The hypothesis that independent boards are attractive to long-term blockholding investments 
(Hypothesis 1.A) is supported. Combined with the result above, this deepens the understanding 
of boards: whereas blockholders decide on short-term investments in firms with a compliant 





board. Specifically, there are more blockholders with long-term investments by 8% (= 0.574 * 
0.139) as board independence improves by 14% (one standard deviation).  
The hypothesis that high leverage is positively related to long-term blockholding 
investments (Hypothesis 2.B) is supported. The findings imply that one standard deviation 
increase in leverage is accompanied by 4.5% (= 0.279 * 0.162) increase in the number of 
retained blockholders with long-term focus. This result could be explained by the view that 
blockholders with a long-term horizon support growth in leverage as a result of an expanding 
and successful firm.7 
Similar to blockholders with short-term investments, investors with long-term focus 
also prefer smaller firms. Explicitly, their number decreases by 19.1% (= –0.126 * 1.518) if the 
firm grows in size by one standard deviation. Hypothesis 4.B is thus supported. 
Considering the results on dividends (Hypothesis 3.B), I reject the null hypothesis that 
dividend payouts would be negatively associated with long-term blockholding investments. I 
find no statistical effect from this variable on long-term investments. This suggests that cash 
flow considerations are less germane to the business case for a long-term investment. 
The results using LT BH (%) back the main findings. When companies have more 
leverage or improve the board by increasing board independence, then blockholders with long-
term investment horizon increase their ownership in those firms the next year. Focusing on 
core businesses and decreasing firm size have the same relation to those investments.  
The findings from the logistic regression analysis in Panel B of Table 2 confirm that 
board independence (Hypothesis 1.A) for Stay LT BH is supported. A more independent board 
encourages long-term investments to continue to stay in the firm. This suggests that investors 
                                               
7 Further investigation reveals that approximately 6.4% of highly levered firms in the sample improve 
their status, become financially safe (measured by Altman Z-Score), and mitigate bankruptcy risk 
leading blockholders to decide on long-term investments in those firms. This finding implies that the 
strategy of higher leverage to induce firm growth but not the risk is associated with long-term 
investments. It is interesting because the results previously show that the same blockholders adopt a 





planning a long-term investment value an independent board; this is in line with the view that 
an independent board will be best placed to take value-enhancing decisions into the future.  
Similar to the finding in Panel A, leverage is attractive to long-term blockholding 
investments. Hence, Hypothesis 2.B is supported. Particularly, the odds of the same 
blockholder decides on long-term investments in a firm increase by 1.076 (= 2.076 – 1) times 
when that firm increases firm leverage by a factor of . 
Dividend growth is now discovered to have a negative effect on the decision of a long-
term blockholding investment. Hence, Hypothesis 3.B is supported. This result is instead in 
keeping with a life-cycle approach to investment targets under which dividends grow as the 
business reaches maturity and the present value of growth opportunities declines.  
Firm size has a negative and significant effect on the odds of keeping a long-term 
blockholding investment. Hypothesis 4.B is thus confirmed as being supported. One unit 
increase in firm size—that is, an increase in firm size by a factor of —multiplies the odds 
ratio by 0.795. This is consistent with the hypothesis that investors adopt a long-term horizon 
in smaller firms with more room for growth in the future. A further explanation could be that 
firms downsize and reduce the number of markets they address. Thereby, they increase focus 
on their core competence and so look to grow stronger.  
The findings show that the same blockholders adopt a longer term investment horizon 
only in certain firms. Companies with higher board independence, higher leverage, and low 
dividends have a higher probability of retaining long-term investments by blockholders. 
Interrogation of the data demonstrates that these firms downsize and reduce the number of 
markets they address. Thereby, they increase their focus on their core competence. These 
insights support the hypothesis of a “passive approach” by blockholders with a long-term 
horizon espoused by a “long-term profit” focus. These investors may not be confident of 





governance in firms to deliver profitable firm policies over the long term. 
 
6. Robustness and Further Analyses 
6.1. Different Investor Horizon Classifications 
One can argue that the current classification for blockholding investments that uses 
realized holding periods includes future information about blockholders’ exit, and hence, it 
may suffer from bias. Regardless of the true intention to be the long or short term, when an 
investment turns extremely bad or extremely good, blockholders may exit much earlier than 
planned. Thus, it might be difficult to differentiate their original intention from such conditional 
exit. To alleviate the concern of conditional exit, I replicate the analyses for long-term 
blockholding investments excluding firms that perform extremely well (top 10 percentile) or 
extremely bad (bottom 10 percentile) in terms of the change in performance throughout the 
holding period.8 By doing so, I keep only the investments in firms that are less likely to deviate 
from their initial intention due to firm performance. I use return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q, 
and stock return to measure firm performance. ROA is net income over total assets. Tobin’s Q 
is market value over book value of total assets. Stock Return is the annual stock return of the 
firm. The results in the Table IA.2, Online Appendix, are still consistent with the original 
findings in Table 2.  
 To show further robustness of the results, I use different investor horizon classifications 
in the literature to identify blockholding investments in this paper. Following Gaspar, Massa 
and Matos (2005) and Yan and Zhang (2009), I calculate the churn rate and classify 
blockholders as short term or long term if they are ranked in the top or bottom tertile of the 
churn rate, respectively. Finally, I construct the number and the ownership percentage of short-
                                               
8 I obtain similar robust results with 15th and 20th percentile cutoff levels separately. The results also 
stay robust when I replicate the exercise for short-term investments to examine blockholdings with 





term and long-term blockholders in each firm. I replicate the main analyses using this 
classification, which should be free from the bias and can reflect the true intention of 
blockholders. The results in the Table IA.3, Online Appendix, are in line with the estimates in 
Table 2, and they strengthen the plausibility of the original findings. 
 
6.2. Board Independence, the SOX Act, and SEC Regulations 
One potential way to mitigate the endogeneity issue regarding the relation between 
board independence and short-term (long-term) blockholding investments is to conduct a DID 
test based on SOX and following SEC rules. Recent studies including Bradley and Chen (2015) 
and Tosun (2018) exploit the passage of the SOX Act and the associated changes in listing 
standards as a natural experiment. Following those studies, I use DID regression to identify the 
causal effect of board independence on short-term and long-term blockholding investments. I 
examine whether, after the shock, board independence affects blockholding investments in 
noncompliant firms. This claim is represented by the interaction of Post and Non-Compliant 
dummies. Non-Compliant is equal to one for firms that did not comply with the “majority of 
board independence” rule by the SEC before 2003, and zero otherwise. Post is a dummy that 
is equal to one for years after 2003, and zero otherwise. Year and firm fixed effects are also 
added to the model along with Leverage, Dividend Ratio, and Firm Size. The model does not 
have indicators for the post-period or non-compliant firms because they are subsumed in the 
firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
 Table 3 reports the results consistent with the original findings. In particular, Non-
Compliant*Post has statistically significant and negative (positive) estimates for the number 
and ownership of short-term (long-term) blockholding investments. The results also confirm 
that smaller firms with a high dividend ratio and high leverage are attractive to short-term 





leveraged companies when they downsize and increase their focus on their core competence. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
6.3. Endogeneity and Dynamic GMM Regression 
To address the potential endogeneity issues in this study (e.g., simultaneity, reverse 
causality, unobservable heterogeneity), I use a dynamic panel GMM estimator suggested by 
Wintoki, Linck and Netter (2012). The basic estimation procedure consists of two essential 
steps. First, I construct first-differenced form of the dynamic model. First-differencing 
eliminates any potential bias that may arise from time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. 
Second, I conduct GMM regression analysis using lagged values of the explanatory variables 
as instruments for the current explanatory variables. That is, I use historical values of the 
number of short-term (long-term) blockholding investment and four fundamental firm 
characteristics as instruments. This will account for potential simultaneity in the analysis. In 
the model, I regress Number of BH with ST Horizon on Board Independence, Leverage, 
Dividend Ratio, and Firm Size, as well as one-year lagged Number of BH with ST Horizon. 
Year dummies are added to the model. The model is specified as follows: 
, =
+ ∗ , + ∗  , + ∗ ,
+ ∗  , + ∗  , + ∗  + ,
       (4) 
where the measure for the number of short-term blockholding investment is Y; the firm 
observation is f = 1, … , N; the entire period is t = 1998, … , 2013; and α, β, γ, δ, ε, θ, ρ, μ are 
the coefficients of the constant term, lagged dependent variable, firm characteristics, year 
dummies, and error term, respectively. The model for long-term blockholding investments has 
a similar setup. Additionally, it includes two-year and three-year lagged Number of BH with 
LT Horizon. The instruments used in the GMM estimation for short-term investments are as 
follows: two- to five-year lagged variables of Number of BH with ST Horizon and four firm 
characteristics, along with Δ Number of BH with ST Horizon t-1, Δ Firm Characteristics t-1, Δ 





year lagged variables of Number of BH with LT Horizon and four firm characteristics, along 
with Δ Number of BH with LT Horizon t-1, Δ Firm Characteristics t-1, Δ Year Dummies t-1, and 
Year Dummies t. The lags of variables as instruments have to start with two years and four 
years for the short-term and long-term investment models, respectively, because I include one 
lag and three lags of the dependent variable in the corresponding dynamic models. I choose the 
upper limit for lags as five years because it enables me to have two years of lagged instrumental 
variables for long-term investment model. To be consistent between models, I apply five-year 
upper limit for lags to the short-term investment model too. Finally, I assume that all the 
regressors in the GMM regression except the year dummies are endogenous. 
 Following Wintoki, Linck and Netter (2012), I conduct several tests to decide on the 
number of lags for the dependent variables and to analyze how strongly the present is correlated 
with the past. First, I estimate a regression of current number of short-term (long-term) 
blockholding investment on four lags of their past values, controlling for other firm-specific 
characteristics. Appendix Table A.3 shows that Number of BH with ST Horizon is significantly 
related to only one-year lag, while statistical significance disappears for two-year lag. 
Considering Number of BH with LT Horizon, the first three lags are statistically significant, 
while older lag is insignificant. Therefore, I include one lag and three lags of the dependent 
variable in the corresponding models. Next, I carry out a test of strict exogeneity using an OLS 
regression of current number of short-term (long-term) blockholding investment on current and 
future values of four fundamental firm policies. Under the null hypothesis of strict exogeneity, 
future realizations of firm variables are unrelated to current blockholding investments. The 
statistically significant coefficients of future firm characteristics in Appendix Table A.4 
suggest that none of the explanatory variables are strictly exogenous. Last, I conduct a set of 
tests with OLS regressions of current firm policies on past number of blockholding investments 





Appendix Table A.5 show that the present and the past values of explanatory variables and the 
dependent variables are correlated and dynamically endogenous. 
 I examine the validity of exogeneity assumptions in the dynamic GMM model through 
several analyses. I carry out AR(1) and AR(2) tests for first-order and second-order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals. By construction, the residuals in first-differences 
(AR(1)) should be correlated, but there should be no serial correlation in second-differences 
(AR(2)). The reported results in Table 4 confirm that. Last, I conduct a Hansen test of 
overidentification under the null that all instruments are valid because the dynamic panel GMM 
estimator uses multiple lags as instruments. I cannot reject the null hypothesis based on the 
reported p-values in Table 4, and that confirms the validity of the instruments.  
 [Insert Table 4 about here] 
Table 4 presents the results from the dynamic GMM regressions that confirm my 
original findings in Table 2. In particular, more blockholders adopt a short-term investment 
focus in firms when they have fewer independent directors on their board, have high leverage, 
and pay out more in dividends. Firm size has the same negative relation to both types of 
blockholding investments. However, the same blockholders decide to keep their stakes longer 
in firms with a more independent board and low dividends.  
 
6.4. Endogeneity in Short-Term Blockholding Investments 
Another potential endogeneity issue is that a blockholder decides to become short- or 
long term after seeing the firm policies, and not entering the investment with a given horizon 
in mind. One can imagine a situation in which if blockholders with long-term investments are 
not content as the changes they desire are not implemented, or if the firm does not develop as 
initially expected, they may sell their shares within a couple of years although they initially 





by them; yet, these investors would count toward Number of BH with ST Horizon in the model 
along with the other blockholders with “true” short-term investments. In order to alleviate this 
endogeneity problem, I repeat the analysis using the investments by blockholders who have at 
least 90% of their portfolios only in short-term investments. To determine these investors, I 
rank blockholders according to the percentage by value of short-term investments in their 
portfolios. I select the blockholders having portfolios with at least 90% short-term investments. 
Table 5 shows the findings from the fixed effects panel OLS regression using Number 
of BH with True ST Horizon. The original results captured in Table 2 are robust. More 
blockholders adopt a short-term horizon when firms are small, pay high dividends, have high 
leverage, and have a less independent board.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
6.5. Survivorship, Omitted Variable Bias, and Multicollinearity 
Long-term blockholding investments are classified as the holdings in a firm for strictly 
more than seven years. Given that the sample period is from 1998 to 2013, some of the long-
term investments may not show the full length of their holding period starting in or after 2005. 
To control for this survivorship bias for those blockholding investments, I focus on only the 
long-term investments before 2005 in a separate sample while keeping other parameters the 
same. Using the main model and this new sample set, I obtain robust findings in Table 6.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Using economic intuition, I identify the fundamental firm policies that would be critical 
in explaining the investment decisions of blockholders. Although I will certainly not have 
captured everything in the analysis, an econometric concern arises if there are omitted variables 
that are both correlated with one of the regressors and separately is determinative of investors’ 
investment decisions. The additional analysis using the dynamic GMM model already 





heterogeneity. To address this concern even further, I expand the range of firm variables: 
Tobin’s Q is market value over book value of total assets. Firm Growth is capital expenditures 
over total assets. R&D Dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has any R&D 
investments (missing values in the data are considered as zero), and zero otherwise. Stock Price 
Volatility is annual standard deviation of daily stock price. Cash Ratio is cash holdings over 
total assets. P/E Ratio is stock price over earnings of firm. Firm Performance is net income 
over total assets. Sales Growth is the difference in sales revenues between the current year and 
the prior year over the revenue in the prior year. Tainted Board is a dummy that equals one if 
the CEO is also a member of the board, and zero otherwise. Board Ownership is the total 
percentage of shares owned by directors on the board. CEO Ownership is the total percentage 
of shares owned by the CEO. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of industry 
concentration. I use a Wald test to individually examine each of these variables for any 
significant improvement of the models with Number of ST BH and Number of LT BH if that 
variable is included in the analysis. Appendix Table A.6 displays findings as chi-square and 
associated probabilities (in italics). I find that none of the changes are statistically significant. 
In further analyses, I include these additional variables in the main model. Table 7 provides a 
comparison between the main and the extended new model. None of the new variables can 
explain Number of ST BH and Number of LT BH. These findings indicate that none of these 
additional variables can improve the model.9 
 [Insert Table 7 about here] 
It is important that the interrelationship among variables in the main model is not so 
strong that it causes a multicollinearity issue. Table 1 already shows that the variables are not 
strongly correlated, making multicollinearity unlikely. I proceed further by exploring the 
                                               
9 The analyses in Table 7 are also replicated using Active BH (%) and Passive BH (%). I obtain similar robust 





variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance measures. Appendix Table A.7 shows that 
interrelation among variables is very low. In particular, tolerance is above 85% for all variables, 
and they have a VIF of almost 1. These results imply that multicollinearity is unlikely to be a 
problem in my analyses. 
 
6.6. Investments by Blockholders with Different Portfolio Structures 
Figure 3 shows that same blockholders have various investments with different 
horizons in their portfolio. So far, I examine each investment by all blockholders. An 
interesting further analysis would be to consider only large shareholders with specific 
portfolios. In particular, I will focus on investments by blockholders having portfolios with at 
least 75% of the investments as short term (long term). These blockholders should then have 
“majorly” short-term (long-term) investment horizon. This analysis will further test the 
robustness of my original findings. In a separate analysis, I will consider only investments by 
blockholders who have portfolios with 50%–60% of the investments as short term (long term). 
These portfolios are almost balanced between short-term and long-term investments. Hence, 
such blockholders have “marginally” short-term (long-term) investment horizon. These 
investments with “marginally different horizons” will enable me to detect whether there are 
firm characteristics that affect the same blockholder similarly while choosing between a short-
term and a long-term horizon. 
 Table 8 provides the findings from the fixed effects panel OLS regression using this 
new sample set. Considering investments by blockholders with majorly short-term (long-term) 
horizon, I obtain similar robust results to the ones in Table 2. Particularly, there are more 
majorly short-term (long-term) blockholding investments in smaller firms that have high 
dividends and a less (more) independent board. The analysis on investments in balanced 





leverage—are the two firm policies that have similar impact on blockholding investments. 
Confirming my main findings, blockholders regardless of short-term or long-term horizon 
invest in smaller firms with high leverage. In other words, large shareholders may sell their 
stakes after one or two years, or hold on to them for more than seven years when those firms 
have a potential to grow due to their small size and increase leverage for either high risk or 
high growth. These results may also indirectly imply that corporate governance—that is, the 
board independence—and dividend policy are the key firm attributes that shape blockholders’ 
decisions on different investment horizons. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
6.7. Active versus Passive Blockholding Investments 
While justifying the relationship between the short-term (long-term) investment choice 
of blockholders and firm policies, I have suggested that the hypothesis of an active (a passive) 
approach by blockholders could explain those findings. A natural next step is to examine 
whether this hypothesis is supported. Clifford (2008) and Clifford and Lindsey (2016) research 
active and passive blockholders explicitly. Following these studies, I define blockholders in 
my sample active versus passive based on whether they file Schedule 13D or Schedule 13G, 
respectively. Then I calculate the number and the percentage ownership of active and passive 
blockholding investments in each firm.10 I repeat the main regression analysis with the new 
dependent variables: Active BH (Num), Active BH (%), Passive BH (Num), and Passive BH 
(%). 
 In Table 9, statistically significant results for Active BH (Num) and Active BH (%) 
suggest that smaller firms with high leverage and high dividend ratio have more active 
blockholding investments. These findings are mainly in line with the short-term blockholding 
investments in Table 2. Overall, the hypothesis of such short-term investments being “active” 
                                               





is supported. Surprisingly, the results for Passive BH (Num) and Passive BH (%) do not support 
strongly the hypothesis that blockholders adopting a long-term horizon are passive. Firm 
policies do not have a significant association with investments by passive blockholders except 
firm size. Passive blockholding investments prefer smaller firms. These puzzling findings for 
passive blockholders need further investigation. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
6.8. Blockholding Investments under Different Economic Conditions 
The analysis studies which firm characteristics encourage investors to decide on a short-
term versus a long-term horizon on average. However, it may be that refining the population 
of firms yields further insights into what blockholders find attractive in differing circumstances. 
I repeat the analysis on subsets of the firm-year variables using a number of different filters. I 
consider the dot-com bubble and subprime mortgage crisis times (2000, 2001, 2008, and 2009), 
firms that have high bankruptcy risk (Altman Z-score <1.81), high stock price volatility (top 
quartile), low liquidity via the Amihud illiquidity measure (top quartile), a busy board which 
is the percentage of directors on the board that also serve on the boards of other firms (top 
quartile), high CEO ownership via the percentage of shares owned by the CEO (top quartile), 
single segment versus conglomerate firms, and firms operating in concentrated (HHI >0.20) 
versus competitive industries (HHI <0.05). Results are presented in Table 10. 
 [Insert Table 10 about here] 
 In Panel A of Table 10, firms retain more blockholding investments in crisis times, both 
short term and long term, when they downsize and focus on core businesses. Keeping leverage 
high for growth is attractive for short-term investments. If a firm has high risk of bankruptcy, 
having a more independent board helps the firm to keep more long-term blockholding 
investments as indicated with 1% level of significance. Conversely, the number of retained 





board. The difference between these investments could be explained by the view that 
blockholders with a short-term horizon keep their stakes in firms with low board independence 
due to higher managerial myopia and take advantage of the high risk before they sell out of the 
stock. Contrary to them, blockholders decide on long-term investments when they are 
convinced that the firm is well managed by the board with many independent directors because 
it is crucial especially when the firm has a risk of bankruptcy. I find similar and consistent 
results regarding board independence for firms with high stock price volatility as well as low 
liquidity. Blockholders with a short-term focus also favor high dividend payouts when the firm 
is risky. For firms with illiquid shares, small firm size gains importance for short-term 
blockholding investments. Considering firms with a “busy board,” they can attract both types 
of investments—that is, short term and long term—if they lever up using more debt for high 
risk and high growth. Results suggest that blockholders with long-term investments demand 
better governance through higher board independence. In particular, one standard deviation 
increase in board independence (about 14%) increases the number of blockholders with a long-
term investment by 8.3% (= 0.598 * 0.139). Differently from short-term focused investors, 
blockholders with a long-term horizon place importance on board independence when firms 
have potentially weak governance due to having a “busy board.” It is because their investments 
are kept in such firms for a long time and independent directors can substitute monitoring effort. 
 In Panel B of Table 10, findings show that more blockholders adopt a short-term 
horizon in firms with lower board independence when the CEO owns a higher stake of the firm. 
This is consistent with the view that insider-dominated boards exhibit higher managerial 
myopia, which is in line with short-term-focused investors. Turning to long-term blockholder 
investments, such investments are related to firms with a smaller firm size. For single-segment 
firms, investment by short-term blockholders is encouraged with fewer outsiders on the board, 





more directors who are outsiders. Specifically, the number of blockholders with a short-term 
(long-term) investment drops by 9% (increases by 7.9%) as board independence increases by 
one standard deviation (about 14%). The results for conglomerate firms suggest that different 
firm policies gain importance for short-term and long-term investments. Particularly, 
blockholders keep their shares shorter in conglomerates when these firms pay out more 
dividends. However, the same blockholders adopt a longer horizon when conglomerates have 
stronger governance with a more independent board, high leverage, and focus on their core 
competence. This can be rationalized by the view that blockholders with long-term investments 
prefer strong and growing conglomerates for consistent high performance in the long run. They 
appreciate conglomerates having their management monitored internally by a strong board, as 
external monitoring requires high effort due to their complicated business structure.  
Comparing firms operating in concentrated to competitive industries, blockholders 
consider different firm policies for their decisions on investment horizon. Specifically, 
corporate governance through board independence is essential for investors regarding 
concentrated industries. More blockholders with a short-term investment are associated with 
firms having a less independent board, while the same investors choose a long-term horizon 
for their investments in firms with more outsiders on the board. For firms operating in 
competitive industries, the strategy is different. Due to high competition, large shareholders 
with a long-term horizon prefer firms focusing on core businesses and keeping blockholding 
investments safe in the long run. Firms operating in competitive industries have more short-
term investments when they have high leverage and pay out more dividends. This is consistent 
with the idea that blockholders with a short-term focus favor high risk through high leverage 
that is aggravated further in a competitive business environment. 
Blockholders have certain preferences for specific industries as displayed in Figure 2. 





forward in blockholders’ decisions on investment horizon considering their preferred 
industries. Using Fama-French 49 industry classification, I construct the following five major 
industry groups: Manufacturing, Construction, Wholesale & Retail, Electronics & 
Telecommunication (High-Tech), and Service (personal, business, healthcare, restaurants, 
entertainment, transportation, etc.). I repeat the fixed effects panel OLS regression model for 
each of these five subsamples. Results are presented in Table 11. 
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
The findings in Table 11 suggest that corporate governance through board 
independence is the only essential policy for both short-term and long-term investments 
considering manufacturing firms. Specifically, a blockholder has a short-term horizon in a 
manufacturing firm with a less independent board, while the same blockholder decides to keep 
the stakes longer in another manufacturing firm with more independent directors on the board.  
Turning to the construction industry, results show that higher leverage is the influential 
firm attribute to keep short-term blockholding investments, while more blockholders with a 
long-term focus invest in firms with a more independent board. Surprisingly, none of the firm 
policies have a significant relation to short-term blockholding investments in wholesale or 
retail firms. Industry characteristics in general rather than firm attributes might be the factors 
that are attractive to blockholders with a short-term horizon. Contrary to them, more long-term 
blockholding investments are related to smaller firms with a strong board in these industries. 
A potential explanation might be that blockholders plan investments to be safe in the long run 
and prefer wholesale or retail firms to focus on their core competence and have their 
management monitored well given the high cyclicality and business risk in these industries. 
Companies in high-tech industries (e.g., electronics and telecommunication) should know that 
investors with a short-term focus prefer smaller firms with weaker corporate governance 





policy, board independence is also an important firm characteristic for large shareholders with 
a long-term horizon. Considering that high-tech industries are highly volatile, these investors 
prefer well-managed high-tech firms with a steady long-term growth through high leverage 
that matches their long-term focus. Service companies can keep more short-term blockholding 
investments when they have low board independence and high dividend ratio. In particular, a 
one–standard deviation (14.4%) drop in board independence corresponds to an increase in the 
number of short-term investments by 11.2% (= –0.775 * 0.144) while that increase is about 
10.9% (= 4.552 * 0.024) for a jump of 2.4% in dividend ratio. For firms operating in service 
sector, higher leverage is the key policy for long-term blockholding investments. 
 
6.9. Short-Term versus Long-Term Investments by Small Investors 
The focus of the paper is on short-term and long-term investments by blockholders. 
However, it might be interesting to extend the study and consider the investments by small 
shareholders to see whether fundamental firm policies including corporate governance, capital 
structure, dividend policy, and firm size have similar associations with those investors as they 
have with large shareholders. I collect data on investments by small investors who own less 
than 5% of a particular firm’s shares. The classification of the investment horizon remains the 
same. Number of Small Investors with ST (LT) Investment Horizon—that is, the new dependent 
variables—are numbers of retained small investors having an investment with a short-term 
(long-term) horizon in that year. I repeat the main analysis with this new sample set. 
 Table 12 provides interesting results. Board independence does not have any 
significance on investments by small shareholders. This finding could be explained by the view 
that small investors do not have the ability or the chance to influence firm management, and 
hence, corporate governance is not a significant policy in their investment decision. Contrary 





coefficients. However, these firm attributes cannot help small investors to choose between 
different investment horizons. They have the same relation to short-term and long-term 
investments by small shareholders. In particular, small investors prefer big firms that have low 
leverage and pay less dividends regardless of short-term or long-term horizon. These results 
could be rationalized by risk aversion. Small shareholders might want to avoid risk in their 
investments, and therefore, they choose to invest in big firms with established businesses and 
low leverage for low risk of financial distress or bankruptcy. Also, firms paying less dividends 
can keep more cash for safety against any future business risks. 
[Insert Table 12 about here] 
7. Conclusion 
Without making strong claims on absolute causality in the relation between firms and 
blockholding investments, this paper studies why the same blockholders adopt a short-term 
versus a long-term investment horizon in different firms. Blockholders decide to keep their 
shares shorter in smaller firms with a less independent board, a high dividend ratio, and high 
leverage, whereas firms have more long-term investments from those blockholders when they 
downsize and focus on their core businesses, improve governance with more outsiders on the 
board, pay out less dividends, and have higher leverage for growth. 
 While I try to mitigate the concerns for potential empirical issues such as endogeneity, 
causality, and omitted variable bias, I also aim to investigate further which firm characteristics 
gain more importance in relation to short-term and long-term blockholding investments under 
various economic conditions. I consider crisis times, high bankruptcy risk, high stock price 
volatility, low liquidity of shares, busy board, high CEO ownership, single versus conglomerate 
firms, industry concentration, as well as different industries preferred by blockholders. Finally, 
I show that those firm policies do not possess any significance in distinguishing between short-





This study is innovative, as I work at the level of the individual investment and examine 
its own time horizon—that is, I consider short-term versus long-term stakes. Now I can focus 
on a large shareholder’s individual investments with different horizons and correctly observe 
firm policies and characteristics that may attract the same blockholder to buy and hold the 
shares for a short- versus a long term. The extensive analyses on the relation between firm 
characteristics and different types of blockholding investments can offer firms guidance in 
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Table A.1: Definition of Variables  
BH with Short-term (ST) 
Investment Horizon 
Blockholders with an investment of at least 5% ownership of a 
particular firm for less than three years. 
BH with Long-term (LT) 
Investment Horizon 
Blockholders with an investment of at least 5% ownership of a 
particular firm for more than seven years. 
Number of ST BH The number of retained blockholding investments in that year 
with a short-term horizon. 
Number of LT BH The number of retained blockholding investments in that year 
with a long-term horizon. 
Stay ST BH Dummy variable that equals one for a blockholder with a short-
term investment of at least 5% ownership in a particular firm in 
that and following year, and zero otherwise. 
Stay LT BH Dummy variable that equals one for a blockholder with a long-
term investment of at least 5% ownership in a particular firm in 
that and following year, and zero otherwise. 
Board Independence Percentage of outsider directors on the board. These directors are 
not associated with the firm. 
Leverage The sum of current liabilities and long-term debt over total 
assets. 
Dividend Ratio  The dividend payment over the market value of the firm. 











Table A.2: Statistical Tests for Models 
 
This table shows statistical test results for the overall model evaluation. To test the validity of the models, Likelihood Ratio, Wald, and Goodness-of-Fit 
(Hosmer-Lemeshow) tests are conducted for fixed effects panel OLS regression (Panel A) and logistic regression models (Panel B). These models are examined 
for an improvement over their baseline model. χ2, degree of freedom “df”, and p-value are provided. In Panel A, the fixed effects panel OLS regression model 
has statistically significant χ2 estimates for the likelihood ratio and Wald tests offering compelling support for the approach. Similarly, the logistic regression 
model passes both tests with statistically significant χ2 estimates in Panel B. The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test compares the realized event incidence 
to the predicted incidence, and so a model which is a good fit should see statistical values approaching zero. A typical requirement is that the p-value of this 
test should exceed 0.05, which is the case here. Taken together, therefore I conclude that I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the suite of logistic models I 
study are indeed a better fit than baseline models. 
 
 
Panel A: Statistical Validation Tests for Fixed Effects Panel OLS Regression Models 
 Likelihood Ratio Test Wald Test  
Model for: χ2 df p-value χ2 df p-value    
Number of BH with 
ST Horizon 
10,338.350 4 0.000 3.250 4 0.011    




4 0.000 4.650 
 
4 0.001    
Panel B: Statistical Validation Tests for Logistic Regression Models 
 Likelihood Ratio Test Wald Test Goodness-of-Fit (Hosmer-Lemeshow) Test 
Model for: χ2 df p-value χ2 df p-value χ2 df p-value 
Stay as Short-Term 
Blockholder 
12,521.380 4 0.000 1,482.430 4 0.000 0.790 4 0.375 
Stay as Long-Term 
Blockholder 







Table A.3: Analysis on Lags of Dependent Variable for System GMM Regression 
This table presents the estimates for lagged values of number of blockholding investments with a 
short-term (ST) and a long-term (LT) horizon using OLS regression. The dependent variable is 
regressed on its lagged values along with board independence, leverage, dividend ratio, and firm size 
as the firm variables. Variable definitions are available in Table A.1, Appendix. Year dummies are 
included. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 














Number of BH t-1 0.424*** 0.357*** 0.722*** 0.605*** 0.574*** 0.631*** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.023) (0.035) (0.045) (0.052) 
Number of BH t-2  0.009  0.149*** 0.118** 0.098* 
  (0.014)  (0.038) (0.051) (0.058) 
Number of BH t-3     0.067* 0.075* 
     (0.038) (0.044) 
Number of BH t-4      0.002 
      (0.047) 
Constant 1.248*** 3.507*** 0.584*** 0.596*** 0.672*** 0.531*** 
 (0.123) (0.071) (0.060) (0.073) (0.103) (0.124) 
Firm Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.273 0.227 0.584 0.585 0.570 0.598 
Observations 9,937 7,447 1,782 1,406 1,052 720 
 
Table A.4: Analysis on Past Blockholder Ownership Adjustment: Test of Strict Exogeneity 
This table presents the estimates from fixed effects panel OLS regression including forward values of 
four firm policies and characteristics. The analysis is to test whether firm policies and characteristics 
adjust to blockholders when they adopt a short-term versus a long-term investment horizons in those firms. 
The dependent variables are the following: Number of BH with ST and LT Horizon are numbers of 
retained blockholding investments with a short-term and a long-term horizon in that year, respectively. 
Board independence, leverage, dividend ratio and firm size are the main regressors. Variable definitions 
are available in Table A.1, Appendix. Year dummies and firm fixed effects are included in all models. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Number of BH with ST Horizon t Number of BH with LT Horizon t 
Board Independence t -0.200 0.213 
 (0.145) (0.170) 
Leverage t 0.334* 0.379** 
 (0.186) (0.192) 
Dividend Ratio t 2.158*** -0.349 
 (0.712) (0.793) 
Firm Size t 0.012 -0.189** 
 (0.063) (0.081) 
Board Independence t+1 0.145 0.280* 
 (0.156) (0.170) 
Leverage t+1 0.260* 0.166 
 (0.153) (0.181) 
Dividend Ratio t+1 0.560 -1.332* 
 (0.800) (0.802) 
Firm Size t+1 -0.138** -0.033 
 (0.066) (0.077) 
Year & Firm FE                    YES                    YES 
Adjusted R2                    9,937                   1,782 
Observations 0.065 0.149 
 
Table A.5: Relationship between Past Blockholding Investments with Short-Term and Long-Term Horizon, Firm Policies and Characteristics 
This table reports estimates from OLS regression of board independence, leverage, dividend ratio and firm size on historic values of these variables and past 
blockholding investments with a short-term versus a long-term horizon in those firms. Variable definitions are available in Table A.1, Appendix. Year 




Independence t Leverage t Dividend Ratio t Firm Size t 
Board 
Independence t Leverage t Dividend Ratio t Firm Size t 
Number of ST  0.001 0.014*** -0.002*** -0.352***     
BH t-1 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.020)     
Number of LT      0.024*** 0.017 -0.001 0.008 
BH t-1     (0.009) (0.011) (0.001) (0.010) 
Board  0.023 0.004 1.890***  0.080 0.011* -0.025 
Independence t-1  (0.025) (0.003) (0.217)  (0.060) (0.006) (0.034) 
Leverage t-1 0.008  0.018*** 1.914*** 0.041  0.005 -0.097*** 
 (0.015)  (0.002) (0.195) (0.044)  (0.006) (0.029) 
Dividend Ratio t-1 0.064 1.190***  9.444*** 0.431 0.757*   
 (0.091) (0.140)  (1.316) (0.390) (0.408)   
Firm Size t-1 0.017*** 0.026*** 0.003***  0.012* 0.038*** 0.001 1.004*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.003) 
Constant 0.497*** -0.022 -0.013*** 7.621*** 0.568*** -0.177*** -0.001 0.033 
 (0.027) (0.032) (0.003) (0.216) (0.062) (0.067) (0.007) (0.040) 
Year Dummies     YES     YES          YES      YES     YES     YES           YES      YES 
Adjusted R2 0.203 0.106 0.091 0.240 0.213 0.137 0.042 0.987 






Table A.6: Analysis of Omitted Variable Bias 
This table presents Wald-Test results as Chi-square and associated probabilities (in italics) for the 
fixed effects panel OLS regression model. A list of additional variables is considered for any potential 
bias due to exclusion from the main model. Each of these variables is tested individually for any 
significant improvement of the model if that variable is included in the analysis. Tobin’s Q is market 
value over book value of total assets. Firm Growth is capital expenditures over total assets. R&D 
Dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has any R&D investments (missing values 
in the data are considered as zero), and zero otherwise. Stock Price Volatility is annual standard 
deviation of daily stock price. Cash Ratio is cash holdings over total assets. P/E Ratio is stock price 
over earnings of firm. Firm Performance is net income over total assets. Sales Growth is the 
difference in sales revenues between the current year and the prior year over the revenue in the prior 
year. Tainted Board is a dummy that equals one if CEO is also a member of the board, and zero 
otherwise. Board Ownership is the total percentage of shares owned by directors on the board. CEO 
Ownership is the total percentage of shares owned by the CEO. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index of industry concentration. 
 
 Number of ST BH Number of LT BH 
Tobin’s Q 0.720 0.040 
 0.397 0.838 
Firm Growth 0.080 1.010 
 0.778 0.319 
R&D Dummy 0.009 1.050 
 0.770 0.306 
Stock Price Volatility 0.090 0.350 
 0.769 0.553 
Cash Ratio 1.900 1.030 
 0.168 0.312 
P/E Ratio 0.001 0.320 
 0.995 0.572 
Firm Performance 0.550 0.460 
 0.458 0.498 
Sales Growth 0.005 2.500 
 0.982 0.115 
Tainted Board 2.220 0.070 
 0.136 0.790 
Board Ownership 0.320 1.780 
 0.572 0.184 
CEO Ownership 1.070 0.050 
 0.301 0.853 
HHI 1.340 0.004 
 0.248 0.989 
 
 
Table A.7: Collinearity Diagnostics for the Variables 
This table presents the results for measures of the strength of interrelationships among variables. 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is an indicator of how much inflation of the standard error can be 
caused by collinearity. Tolerance is an indicator of how much collinearity that a regression can 
tolerate. The tolerance for a particular variable is 1 minus the R-sq that results from the regression of 
the other variables on that variable. Variable definitions are available in Table A.1, Appendix. 
 
 VIF VIF-sqrt Tolerance R-sq 
Board Independence 1.060 1.030 0.945 0.055 
Leverage 1.110 1.050 0.903 0.098 
Dividend Ratio 1.080 1.040 0.922 0.078 
Firm Size 1.160 1.080 0.860 0.140 






Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
This table provides descriptive statistics for the main variables. Variable definitions are available in 
Table A.1. The time span for this study is between 1998 and 2013. There are 5146 investors, 1836 
firms, and 9972 firm-year observations in this study. Panel A presents statistics on investment 
characteristics. Panels B and C give statistics on characteristics of firms with all blockholders (BH), 
short-term blockholding (ST BH), and long-term blockholding (LT BH) investments, respectively. 
Panel D presents correlation between the variables used in analyses. 
Panel A: Characteristics of Investments 
 Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
Percentage of BH Investments 0.165 0.371 N/A   
Holding Period 3.953 2.244 3.000   
% of ST BH Investments 0.253 0.478 N/A   
% of LT BH Investments 0.176 0.265 N/A   
Number of ST BH Investments 1.942 1.114 2.00 0.00 8.00 
Number of LT BH Investments 1.023 0.570 1.00 0.00 4.00 
Panel B: Characteristics of Firms Invested by All Blockholders (BH) 
 Mean Std. Dev. Median 
Board Independence 0.750 0.143 0.778 
Leverage 0.217 0.176 0.202 
Dividend Ratio 0.014 0.024 0.006 
Firm Size 7.872 1.520 7.744 
Panel C: Characteristics of Firms with Short-Term & Long-Term Blockholding Investments 
 Firms with ST BH 
Investments 
Firms with LT BH 
Investments 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean 
Differences 
Board Independence 0.747 0.144 0.756 0.139 -0.009*** 
Leverage 0.217 0.177 0.219 0.162 -0.002* 
Dividend Ratio 0.014 0.024 0.016 0.022 -0.002*** 
Firm Size 7.827 1.527 7.914 1.518 -0.087*** 
Panel D: Correlation Matrix 
 Board 
Independence Leverage Dividend Ratio Firm Size 
Board Independence 1.000      
Leverage 0.033 1.000     
Dividend Ratio 0.094 0.216 1.000   





Table 2: Estimates from Fixed Effects Panel OLS, Logit and Logistic Regressions 
 
This table presents the estimates from fixed effects panel OLS regression in Panel A. The number 
and the ownership of retained short-term (ST) and long-term (LT) blockholding investments are 
regressed on four fundamental firm policies and characteristics. In Panel B, the estimates from both 
logit and logistic regressions of the odds of staying as a blockholding investment (ST and LT) on 
four firm policies and characteristics are given. The dependent variables are the following. In Panel 
A, ST and LT BH (Number and %) are numbers and percentage ownership of retained blockholding 
investments with a short-term and a long-term horizon in that year, respectively. In Panel B, Stay ST 
(LT) BH are the dummy variables that equal one for a blockholder with a short-term (long-term) 
investment of at least 5% ownership in a particular firm in that and following year and stays as a 
blockholder in that firm. Board independence, leverage, dividend ratio, and firm size are the 
regressors. Board independence is the percentage of outsider directors on the board. These directors 
are not associated with the firm. Leverage is the sum of current liabilities and long-term debt over 
total assets. Dividend Ratio is the dividend payment over the market value of the firm. Firm Size is 
the natural logarithm of total assets measured in $ millions. All regressors are one year lagged for the 
OLS regression model, and firm fixed effects are included. Year dummies are included in all models. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm and investment-firm level for OLS and logistic regression 
models, respectively. Betas, Odds Ratios (exponential of betas) and standard errors of betas are 
reported in Panel B. The ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A: Estimates from Fixed Effects Panel OLS Regression Model  
Lagged Regressors ST BH (Number) ST BH (%) LT BH (Number) LT BH (%) 
Board Independence t-1 -0.391*** -0.032*** 0.574*** 0.037*** 
 (0.129) (0.007) (0.152) (0.013) 
Leverage t-1 0.103 -0.004 0.279* 0.042*** 
 (0.154) (0.008) (0.149) (0.015) 
Dividend Ratio t-1 1.235* 0.099*** 0.012 0.037 
 (0.688) (0.034) (0.602) (0.069) 
Firm Size t-1 -0.068** -0.005*** -0.126*** -0.017*** 
 (0.033) (0.002) (0.045) (0.005) 
Constant 1.483*** 0.180*** 1.508*** 0.195*** 
 (0.279) (0.018) (0.365) (0.034) 
Year & Firm FE          YES     YES           YES                  YES              
Adjusted R2 0.076 0.010 0.102 0.087 
Observations          9,289     9,289           2,183              2,183         
 
Panel B: Estimates from Logit (Betas) & Logistic (Odds Ratio) Regression Model 
  Odds Ratio (eβ) 
(Above 5%) Stay ST BH t+1 Stay LT BH t+1 Stay ST BH t+1 Stay LT BH t+1 
Board -0.443*** 0.929** 0.642*** 2.533** 
Independence t (0.077) (0.456)   
Leverage t 0.615*** 0.730* 1.850*** 2.076* 
 (0.058) (0.397)   
Dividend Ratio t 2.367*** -5.800*** 10.667*** 0.003*** 
 (0.471) (2.174)   
Firm Size t -0.264*** -0.230*** 0.768*** 0.795*** 
 (0.007) (0.038)   
Pseudo R-sq. 0.042 0.072 0.042 0.072 






Table 3: Difference-in-Difference (DID) Analysis regarding Board Independence 
This table reports panel OLS regression estimates for Post, Non-Compliant, Non-Compliant*Post, as 
well as, Leverage, Dividend Ratio, and Firm Size. The number and the ownership of retained short-
term (ST) and long-term (LT) blockholding investments are the dependent variables. Non-
Compliant*Post is the interaction variable of Post and Non-Compliant. Non-Compliant is equal to 
one for firms that did not comply with SOX and SEC regulation prior 2003, and zero otherwise. Post 
is a dummy that is equal to one for years after 2003, and zero otherwise. Variable definitions are 
available in Table A.1, Appendix. Year and firm fixed effects are included. The model does not have 
indicators for the non-compliant firms or the post-period because they are subsumed in the firm and 
year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 ST BH (Number) ST BH (%) LT BH (Number) LT BH (%) 
Non-Compliant*Post -0.138** -0.009* 0.188*** 0.014* 
 (0.062) (0.005) (0.053) (0.008) 
Leverage 0.620*** 0.035*** 0.164* 0.034** 
 (0.134) (0.009) (0.091) (0.016) 
Dividend Ratio 2.547*** 0.068 -0.478 0.007 
 (0.604) (0.056) (0.534) (0.066) 
Firm Size -0.148*** -0.011*** -0.125*** -0.016*** 
 (0.032) (0.001) (0.028) (0.004) 
Constant 1.765*** 0.208*** 1.943*** 0.219*** 
 (0.258) (0.010) (0.221) (0.035) 
Year & Firm FE YES   YES           YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.107 0.083 0.156 0.096 






















































Table 4: Estimates from Dynamic GMM Regression Model Regarding Endogeneity Issue 
 
This table presents the estimates from dynamic GMM regression of Number of Blockholding 
Investments with Short-Term (Long-Term) Horizon on board independence, leverage, dividend ratio, 
and firm size, as regressors. Lagged values of dependent variables and regressors are included as a 
part of dynamic GMM model. The dependent variables are Number of BH with ST (LT) Horizon. 
They are numbers of retained blockholding investments with a short-term and a long-term horizon in 
that year, respectively. Variable definitions are available in Table A.1, Appendix. Year dummies are 
included. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order 
and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of no serial 
correlation. The Hansen test of over-identification is under the null that all instruments are valid. P-
values from these tests are provided. 
 
 Number of BH with ST 
Horizon t  
Number of BH with LT 
Horizon t 
Board Independence t -0.797* 0.744* 
 (0.444) (0.439) 
Leverage t 0.914*** 0.451 
 (0.349) (0.417) 
Dividend Ratio t 6.897** -7.485** 
 (3.397) (3.579) 
Firm Size t -0.140** -0.070* 
 (0.071) (0.038) 
Number of BH with ST  0.269***  
Horizon t-1 (0.020)  
Number of BH with LT   0.438*** 
Horizon t-1  (0.081) 
Number of BH with LT   0.047 
Horizon t-2  (0.080) 
Number of BH with LT   -0.064 
Horizon t-3  (0.062) 
Constant 2.544*** 0.584 
 (0.714) (0.456) 
Year Dummies                    YES                    YES 
Lags of Firm Variables                    YES                    YES 
Observations                    9,937                    1,052 
AR(1) Test (p-value) (0.000) (0.001) 
AR(2) Test (p-value) (0.802) (0.578) 



























Table 5: Endogeneity Test through Refined Sample of Blockholders with Short-Term Horizon 
This table presents the estimates from fixed effects panel OLS regression. The number of retained 
blockholding investments with a short-term (ST) horizon is regressed on four fundamental firm 
policies and characteristics. For this analysis, the investments by blockholders who have at least 90% 
of their portfolios in short-term investments only are used. These are classified as blockholders with 
true short-term investment horizon. Number of BH with true ST horizon is the dependent variable 
that is the number of retained blockholding investments with a true short-term horizon in that year. 
Board independence, leverage, dividend ratio, and firm size are the regressors in the model. They are 
one year lagged. Variable definitions are available in Table A.1, Appendix. Year and firm fixed 
effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The ***, ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Lagged Regressors Number of BH with true ST Horizon 
Board Independence t-1 -0.437*** 
 (0.113) 
Leverage t-1 0.266** 
 (0.130) 
Dividend Ratio t-1 0.922* 
 (0.559) 




Year & Firm FE YES 
Adjusted R2 0.054 
Observations 8,937 
 
Table 6: Survivorship Bias Test for Blockholding Investments with Long-Term (LT) Horizon 
This table presents the estimates from fixed effects panel OLS regression. The number of retained 
blockholding investments with a long-term (LT) horizon are regressed on four fundamental firm 
policies and characteristics. Among those long-term investments in the sample, only the ones that 
become blockholding investment up until 2005 are included in this analysis. Number of BH with LT 
Horizon is the dependent variable that is the number of retained blockholding investment with a long-
term horizon in that year. Board independence, leverage, dividend ratio, and firm size are the 
regressors in the model. They are one year lagged. Variable definitions are available in Table A.1, 
Appendix. Year and firm fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
The ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Lagged Regressors Number of BH with LT Horizon 
Board Independence t-1 0.333** 
 (0.162) 
Leverage t-1 0.389** 
 (0.185) 
Dividend Ratio t-1 -0.360 
 (1.201) 




Year & Firm FE YES 








Table 7: Estimates from Fixed Effects Panel OLS Regression with Omitted Variables 
This table presents the estimates from fixed effects panel OLS regression including potentially omitted 
variables. The dependent variables, Number of ST and LT BH, are numbers of blockholding investments 
with a short-term and a long-term horizon in that year, respectively. Board independence, leverage, 
dividend ratio, and firm size are the main regressors. Omitted variables are the following: Tobin’s Q is 
market value over book value of total assets. Firm Growth is capital expenditures over total assets. R&D 
Dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has any R&D investments (missing values in the 
data are considered as zero), and zero otherwise. Stock Price Volatility is annual standard deviation of 
daily stock price. Cash Ratio is cash holdings over total assets. P/E Ratio is stock price over earnings of 
firm. Firm Performance is net income over total assets. Sales Growth is the difference in sales revenues 
between the current year and the prior year over the revenue in the prior year. Tainted Board is a dummy 
that equals one if CEO is also a member of the board, and zero otherwise. Board Ownership is the total 
percentage of shares owned by directors on the board. CEO Ownership is the total percentage of shares 
owned by the CEO. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of industry concentration. All regressors are 
one year lagged. Variable definitions are available in Table A.1, Appendix. Year dummies and firm fixed 
effects are included in all models. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The ***, ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Lagged Regressors &   
Omitted Variables  
Number of   
ST BH t 
Number of     
ST BH t 
Number of     
LT BH t 
Number of    
LT BH t 
Board Independence t-1 -0.391*** -0.469** 0.574*** 0.641*** 
 (0.129) (0.183) (0.152) (0.215) 
Leverage t-1 0.103 0.422* 0.279* 0.380* 
 (0.154) (0.245) (0.149) (0.230) 
Dividend Ratio t-1 1.235* 3.753* 0.012 0.128 
 (0.688) (1.940) (0.602) (0.649) 
Firm Size t-1 -0.068** -0.198*** -0.126*** -0.108* 
 (0.033) (0.056) (0.045) (0.061) 
Tobin’s Q t-1  0.003  -0.026 
  (0.024)  (0.023) 
Firm Growth t-1  -0.571  -0.757 
  (0.527)  (0.547) 
R&D Dummy t-1  0.212  0.172 
  (0.183)  (0.112) 
Stock Price Volatility t-1  -0.002  -0.005 
  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Cash Ratio t-1  0.054  0.281 
  (0.295)  (0.233) 
P/E Ratio t-1  0.001  -0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.003) 
Firm Performance t-1  0.161  0.186 
  (0.161)  (0.225) 
Sales Growth t-1  0.049  -0.094 
  (0.076)  (0.069) 
Tainted Board t-1  -0.013  0.039 
  (0.063)  (0.060) 
Board Ownership t-1  -0.362  -0.132 
  (0.287)  (0.279) 
CEO Ownership t-1  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.006)  (0.005) 
HHI t-1  -0.001  0.059 
  (0.197)  (0.105) 
Year & Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.076 0.028 0.102 0.146 







Table 8: Analyses on Blockholders with Different Portfolio Structures 
This table presents the estimates from fixed effects panel OLS regression. The analysis in Table 2, 
Panel A is repeated for four groups of blockholders with specific portfolios only: Blockholders have 
“majorly” short-term (long-term) investment horizon if their portfolios have at least 75% of the 
investments as short-term (long-term). They have “marginally” short-term (long-term) investment 
horizon if 50% to 60% of their portfolios are short-term (long-term) investments, i.e. if their 
portfolios are almost balanced between short-term and long-term investments. The dependent 
variable in each regression analysis is the number of investments by blockholders belonging to one 
of those four groups, respectively. Board independence, leverage, dividend ratio, and firm size are 
the regressors in the model. They are one year lagged. Variable definitions are available in Table 
A.1, Appendix. Year and firm fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level. The ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 ST Investments LT Investments ST Investments LT Investments 
 at least 75% of BH’s Portfolio 50% to 60% of BH’s Portfolio 
 Number of BH 
with “Majorly” 
ST Horizon t 
Number of BH 
with “Majorly” 
LT Horizon t 
Number of BH 
with “Marginally” 
ST Horizon t 
Number of BH 
with “Marginally” 
LT Horizon t 
Board  -0.397*** 0.574* -0.873 0.277 
Independence t-1 (0.129) (0.313) (0.935) (0.319) 
Leverage t-1 0.152 0.288* 1.571* 1.380** 
 (0.147) (0.160) (0.845) (0.665) 
Dividend Ratio t-1 1.066* 2.041 3.486 -0.171 
 (0.638) (1.280) (2.216) (0.984) 
Firm Size t-1 -0.074** -0.084* -0.277* -0.127* 
 (0.037) (0.050) (0.163) (0.075) 
Constant 1.531*** 1.199*** 2.958* 1.463* 
 (0.313) (0.424) (1.740) (0.865) 
Year & Firm FE         YES         YES          YES          YES 
Adjusted R2 0.071 0.289 0.239 0.189 
Observations        7,891         1,035           149          111 
 
Table 9: Analysis on Active and Passive Blockholding Investments 
This table presents estimates from fixed effects panel OLS regression of number and percenatge of active 
(passive) blockholding investments on four fundamental firm characteristics. The dependent variables are 
Active BH (Num) or (%) and Passive BH (Num) or (%). Following Clifford (2008) and Clifford and 
Lindsey (2016), blockholders are active versus passive based on whether they file Schedule 13D and 
Schedule 13G, respectively. Board independence, leverage, dividend ratio, and firm size are the regressors 
in the model representing the fundamental firm policies and characteristics. They are one year lagged. 
Variable definitions are available in Table A.1, Appendix. Year and firm fixed effects are included. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Active BH (Num) t Active BH (%) t Passive BH (Num) t Passive BH (%) t 
Board  0.101 0.006 -0.011 -0.002 
Independence t-1 (0.213) (0.018) (0.008) (0.002) 
Leverage t-1 0.619*** 0.067*** 0.006 -0.001 
 (0.232) (0.020) (0.012) (0.002) 
Dividend  1.014* 0.122* -0.007 0.001 
Ratio t-1 (0.602) (0.066) (0.033) (0.004) 
Firm Size t-1 -0.285*** -0.023*** -0.004*** -0.003** 
 (0.070) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 4.531*** 0.337*** 0.049*** 0.004*** 
 (0.564) (0.045) (0.014) (0.001) 
Year & Firm FE          YES YES          YES           YES 
Adjusted R2 0.097 0.086 0.026 0.025 





Table 10: Analyses of the Effect of Firm Policies and Characteristics on Blockholders’ Investment Horizon under Different Conditions 
 
This table presents the estimates from fixed effects panel OLS regressions. The impact of four fundamental firm policies and characteristics on the number 
of retained blockholding investments with a short-term (ST) versus a long-term (LT) horizon is examined under different conditions. In Panel A, the following 
conditions are considered: dot-com bubble and sub-prime mortgage crisis times (2000, 2001, 2008, and 2009), high bankruptcy risk (Altman Z-Score < 1.81), 
high stock price volatility (top quartile), low liquidity via Amihud Illiquidity measure (top quartile), busy board which is the percentage of directors on the 
board that also serve on the boards of other firms (top quartile). In Panel B, the following conditions are considered: high CEO ownership via the percentage 
of shares owned by the CEO (top quartile), single segment versus conglomerate firms, firms operating in concentrated (HHI > 0.20) versus competitive 
industries (HHI < 0.05). The dependent variables are Number of ST BH and Number of LT BH. They are numbers of retained blockholding investments with 
a short-term and a long-term horizon in that year, respectively. Board independence, leverage, dividend ratio, and firm size are the regressors in the model. 
They are one year lagged. Variable definitions are available in Table A.1, Appendix. Year and firm fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered 
at the firm level. The ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Analyses for Crisis Times, High Bankruptcy Risk, High Volatility, Low Liquidity, and Busy Board 




of ST BH 
Number 

















Board  -0.355 0.076 -0.842** 1.381*** -0.934*** 0.549* -0.698** 0.762*** -0.246 0.598** 
Independence t-1 (0.271) (0.250) (0.341) (0.430) (0.301) (0.333) (0.318) (0.226) (0.230) (0.278) 
Leverage t-1 0.548* 0.334 0.056 0.343 -0.528 -0.346 -0.0402 0.374 0.428* 0.426* 
 (0.310) (0.225) (0.370) (0.343) (0.383) (0.306) (0.396) (0.301) (0.250) (0.223) 
Dividend  0.605 1.441 1.028 0.232 2.867* -0.303 1.132 1.028 0.024 -0.099 
Ratio t-1 (1.243) (0.946) (1.026) (0.649) (1.476) (2.132) (1.243) (0.631) (0.761) (0.675) 
Firm Size t-1 -0.127* -0.212*** -0.199** -0.119 -0.059 0.026 -0.218* -0.139 -0.041 -0.326*** 
 (0.074) (0.077) (0.082) (0.088) (0.096) (0.097) (0.125) (0.096) (0.061) (0.084) 
Constant 2.048*** 2.608*** 2.891*** 0.969 2.189*** 0.408 2.825*** 0.580 1.072** 3.087*** 
 (0.583) (0.604) (0.765) (0.740) (0.746) (0.706) (0.788) (0.596) (0.522) (0.671) 
Year & Firm FE YES   YES    YES    YES   YES    YES    YES   YES   YES   YES 
Adjusted R2 0.055 0.191 0.086 0.204 0.098 0.076 0.034 0.204 0.076 0.126 












Table 10: Analyses of the Effect of Firm Policies and Characteristics on Blockholders’ Investment Horizon under Different Conditions (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Analyses for High CEO Ownership, Single Segment vs Conglomerate Firms, and Concentrated vs Competitive Industries  
 High CEO Ownership Single Segment Firms Conglomerate Firms Firms in Concentrated 
Industries 











of LT BH 
Number 











Board  -0.499** 0.089 -0.645** 0.562** -0.114 0.691*** -0.525* 0.955*** -0.167 0.042 
Independence t-1 (0.204) (0.199) (0.262) (0.259) (0.171) (0.193) (0.278) (0.244) (0.225) (0.285) 
Leverage t-1 0.005 0.291 -0.136 0.208 0.248 0.353** 0.329 0.094 0.373* 0.294 
 (0.236) (0.223) (0.246) (0.285) (0.204) (0.176) (0.301) (0.224) (0.222) (0.327) 
Dividend  -0.327 1.383 1.674 -1.267 1.205* 0.550 0.877 1.039 3.046*** -1.181 
Ratio t-1 (1.282) (0.887) (1.068) (1.536) (0.708) (0.674) (1.220) (0.694) (0.913) (1.347) 
Firm Size t-1 0.024 -0.164** -0.018 -0.085 -0.055 -0.139** 0.063 -0.104 -0.101 -0.148* 
 (0.066) (0.073) (0.078) (0.080) (0.045) (0.064) (0.086) (0.076) (0.076) (0.089) 
Constant 1.067** 2.426*** 1.609*** 1.250** 1.354*** 1.499*** 0.746 1.084* 1.570** 2.072*** 
 (0.517) (0.641) (0.591) (0.523) (0.374) (0.481) (0.705) (0.573) (0.651) (0.680) 
Year & Firm FE   YES   YES   YES   YES   YES   YES   YES   YES   YES    YES 
Adjusted R2 0.045 0.144 0.077 0.120 0.073 0.114 0.077 0.105 0.033 0.091 

































Table 11: Analyses of the Effect of Firm Policies and Characteristics on Blockholders’ Investment Horizon in Different Industries 
 
This table presents the estimates from fixed effects panel OLS regressions. The impact of four fundamental firm policies and characteristics on the number 
of retained blockholding investments with a short-term (ST) versus a long-term (LT) horizon is examined in different industries. Using Fama-French 49 
industry classification, the following five major industry groups are constructed: Manufacturing, Construction, Wholesale & Retail, Electronics & 
Telecommunication (High-Tech), and Service (Personal, business, healthcare, restaurants, entertainment, transportation, etc). These are the industries of firms 
which are preferred by short-term and long-term blockholders in their investment portfolios (see Figure 2). The dependent variables are Number of ST BH 
and Number of LT BH. They are numbers of retained blockholding investments with a short-term and a long-term horizon in that year, respectively. Board 
independence, leverage, dividend ratio, and firm size are the regressors in the model. They are one year lagged. Variable definitions are available in Table 
A.1, Appendix. Year and firm fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 




of ST BH 
Number 

















Board  -0.772** 0.621* 0.654 0.916* -0.292 0.434* -0.559* 0.591* -0.775** -0.149 
Independence t-1 (0.345) (0.370) (0.702) (0.479) (0.398) (0.253) (0.307) (0.301) (0.325) (0.411) 
Leverage t-1 0.679 0.039 1.519** 0.350 -0.217 -0.464 0.413 0.654** -0.561 0.669* 
 (0.447) (0.312) (0.633) (0.399) (0.451) (0.463) (0.305) (0.289) (0.476) (0.369) 
Dividend  -0.760 0.741 0.094 0.265 1.030 0.781 1.503* 0.548 4.552*** -0.436 
Ratio t-1 (2.385) (3.059) (1.401) (0.715) (1.808) (1.339) (0.803) (1.224) (1.580) (2.481) 
Firm Size t-1 -0.094 0.121 0.157 -0.089 -0.003 -0.352*** -0.167** -0.062 0.021 -0.043 
 (0.087) (0.120) (0.122) (0.109) (0.118) (0.123) (0.068) (0.079) (0.119) (0.154) 
Constant 1.739*** -0.454 0.763 0.880 1.651* 3.671*** 2.652*** 0.985* 1.292 1.269 
 (0.658) (0.942) (1.000) (0.866) (0.931) (1.021) (0.574) (0.518) (0.828) (0.981) 
Year & Firm FE   YES   YES    YES    YES   YES    YES    YES   YES   YES   YES 
Adjusted R2 0.068 0.106 0.149 0.134 0.082 0.147 0.075 0.171 0.099 0.120 













Table 12: Analyses on Small Investors with Short-Term versus Long-Term Horizon 
 
This table shows estimates from fixed effects panel OLS regression. The number of retained short-term 
(ST) and long-term (LT) investments by small investors are regressed on four fundamental firm 
policies and characteristics. Small investors are the investors who own less than 5% of a particular 
firm’s shares. The dependent variables are Number of Small Investors with ST (LT) Investment 
Horizon. They are numbers of retained small investors having an investment with a short-term and a 
long-term horizon in that year, respectively. Board independence, leverage, dividend ratio, and firm 
size are the regressors in the model representing the fundamental firm policies and characteristics. 
They are one year lagged. Variable definitions are available in Table A.1, Appendix. Year and firm 
fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The ***, ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Number of Small Investors with 
 ST Investment Horizon t LT Investment Horizon t 
Board Independence t-1 3.237 4.941 
 (4.613) (5.758) 
Leverage t-1 -21.501*** -31.250*** 
 (5.327) (5.138) 
Dividend Ratio t-1 -96.971*** -43.221*** 
 (32.90) (13.180) 
Firm Size t-1 17.930*** 20.380*** 
 (2.253) (2.734) 
Constant -95.681*** -124.410*** 
 (17.390) (23.291) 
Year & Firm FE YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.472 0.359 









































Figure 1: Blockholder Characteristics 
This figure presents different characteristics of blockholders in the sample. Panel A shows 
the percentage distribution of all blockholders in the sample according to different ownership 
intervals. Panel B displays total number of blockholdings per year. Investments in different 
firms by the same blockholder are counted as separate blockholdings. Panel B also presents 
average firm ownership by a blockholder per year. 
Panel A: Distribution of Blockholders Regarding Ownership Intervals  
 



































































Figure 2: Industry Sector Distribution of Firms in Short-Term and Long-Term 
Investment Portfolios 
This figure presents distribution of industry sector of firms in blockholders’ short-term and 
long-term investment portfolios. The following industry sector groups are considered: 
Nondurable Goods (food, tobacco, textile, toys), Durable Goods (car, furniture, household 
appliances), Manufacturing (machinery, trucks, paper, printing), Energy, Chemicals, High-





Figure 3: Distribution of Blockholders Based on Long-term and Short-Term 
Investments  
This figure displays the percentage distribution of blockholders in the sample according to 
the percentage difference between long-term and short-term investments in their portfolios. 
Long-term Blockholders hold their ownership in that particular firm for more than seven 



































Percentage Differences between LT and ST Investments
